# Speech

# 1AC

## Plan

The United States Federal Government should substantially increase its economic engagement in its US-Mexico Land Ports of Entry on the US-Mexico border.

## 1AC Relations Adv.

First, despite the growing importance of US-Mexico relations, new BILATERAL initiatives are necessary to jump start improvements – improving the movement of people and goods is the key location for dialogue.

O’Neil 2013
Shannon O'Neil is Senior Fellow for Latin America Studies at the Council on Foreign Relations (CFR), “U.S. Exports Depend on Mexico ” Latin America’s Moment January 11 <http://blogs.cfr.org/oneil/2013/01/11/u-s-exports-depend-on-mexico/>

Hidden behind the troubling headlines, however, is another, more hopeful Mexico — one undergoing rapid and widespread social, political, and economic transformation. Yes, Mexico continues to struggle with grave security threats, but it is also fostering a globally competitive marketplace, a growing middle class, and an increasingly influential pro-democracy voter base. In addition, Mexico’s ties with the United States are changing. Common interests in energy, manufacturing, and security, as well as an overlapping community formed by millions of binational families, have made Mexico’s path forward increasingly important to its northern neighbor. For most of the past century, U.S.-Mexican relations were conducted at arm’s length. That began to change, however, in the 1980s and, even more, after the 1994 North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) spurred greater bilateral economic engagement and cooperation. Mexico’s democratic transition has further eased the wariness of some skeptics in Washington. Still, the U.S.-Mexican relationship is far from perfect. New bilateral policies are required, especially to facilitate the movement of people and goods across the U.S.-Mexican border. More important, the United States needs to start seeing Mexico as a partner instead of a problem.

Infrastructure investment rebalances the relationship — overcomes alternate causalities.

Selee and Wilson 12 — Andrew Selee, Vice President for Programs and Senior Adviser for the Mexico Institute at the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, Adjunct Professor of Government at Johns Hopkins University and of International Affairs at George Washington University, former Visiting Professor at El Colegio de Mexico, holds a Ph.D. in Policy Studies from the University of Maryland, an M.A. in Latin American Studies from the University of California-San Diego, and a B.A. in Latin American Studies from Washington University in St. Louis, and Christopher E. Wilson, Associate at the Mexico Institute of the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, previously served as a Mexico Analyst for the U.S. Military and as a researcher at American University’s Center for North American Studies, holds an M.A. in International Affairs from American University, 2012 (“Getting ready for a new era in U.S.-Mexico ties,” *Global Public Square*—Fareed Zakaria’s CNN blog, December 3rd, Available Online at http://globalpublicsquare.blogs.cnn.com/2012/12/03/Getting-Ready-for-a-New-Era-in-U-S-Mexico-Ties/, Accessed 07-26-2013)

U.S.-Mexico relations have been dominated for the past six years by efforts to address drug trafficking and organized crime-related violence. This was the right thing to do while violence spiked in Mexico, but with a new administration in office after the swearing in of President Enrique Peña Nieto over the weekend, the time has come to re-balance the bilateral relationship.¶ Ties tend to have the same top three items on the agenda year after year and administration after administration: immigration; drugs and violence; and trade and economic relations. Drugs and violence have dominated in recent years, and cooperation in addressing the transnational flows of drugs, arms and illicit money, as well as support for Mexico’s efforts to strengthen public security, must continue. Although the gains are still tenuous and the situation fluid, violence in Mexico does appear to have begun to decline at a national level and major advances have been made in key border cities such as Tijuana and Ciudad Juarez.¶ Immigration dominated the early 2000's as presidents Bush and Fox sought a bilateral deal on the topic, but it has since become clear that immigration reform is first and foremost a domestic political issue in the United States. The rate of unauthorized immigration from Mexico has now dropped to historically low levels – there are at least as many leaving as arriving – which should allow for a more rational and reasoned debate on this issue in the United States.¶ However, not since the negotiation and implementation of NAFTA in the 1990s have economic relations topped the bilateral agenda. Trade and jobs should once again top the U.S. agenda with Mexico for three main reasons.¶ First, the economy most likely will be the top issue in both the United States and Mexico for the next several years. Economic issues were clearly the top issue for voters in the recent U.S. presidential elections, and in Mexico they matched public security as the top set of concerns.¶ Second, by focusing on the creation of jobs and improving the competitiveness of manufacturers on both sides of the border, we can improve the tone of the relationship. We may even find that the stickier issues of security and migration become a little less intractable.¶ Finally, the economic agenda between the two countries has the potential to yield tangible results, creating jobs and improving the competitive position of North America vis-a-vis Asia. For years, Mexico has oriented its economy toward the U.S. in hopes of harnessing the growth of the world’s most dynamic economy. Now, at a time when Mexico is growing around four percent a year – faster than the United States – Mexico can return the favor and provide a boost to the U.S. economy. Meanwhile, Mexico’s large and growing middle class has become an increasingly important market for U.S. products.¶ As it turns out, U.S. and Mexican companies do not simply sell products to one another, they build products together, with parts zigzagging back and forth across the border as goods are manufactured. As a result, a product imported from Mexico is, on average, made of 40 percent U.S. parts and materials, meaning forty cents of every dollar spent of Mexican imports stays right here in the United States. Chinese products, in contrast, contain just four percent U.S. content.¶ This also means the competitiveness of our two countries is closely linked, and improvements in productivity in one nation make a co-manufactured product cheaper and more competitive on the global market. That is to say, growth in Mexico or the United States will boost exports from both countries: when it comes to manufacturing, we are in it together.¶ To produce results, the U.S.-Mexico economic agenda needs substance, and there is plenty to do. To start out, we must make the southwest border more efficient without sacrificing security. Today, long and unpredictable wait times act as a type of border tax, cutting away at manufacturers’ competitiveness a bit more each time they send goods across the border.¶ Since we manufacture and export together, the United States should also join forces with Mexico and Canada in designing and implementing a global trade strategy. The first step is robust cooperation in the Trans-Pacific Partnership negotiations, but the end goal must be to expand the agreement until countries like China and India feel they will lose out if they do not join in.¶ The countries could also tackle ways of making customs procedures more efficient, ensuring regulatory frameworks are compatible, and integrating our transportation and logistics networks to keep up with regional manufacturers, who have already integrated production.¶ In the end, it is a matter of perspective. If Mexico is seen more as a business partner than a source of intractable problems, a whole range of policy options that were previously considered too risky to be tried will be within reach. If such a change in perception occurs, the results will speak for themselves.

Successful cooperation on border crossing for goods spills over into other areas of relations – it’s the best opportunity to improve relations.

Bonner & Rozental 2009
Robert C. Bonner Former Commissioner of U.S. Customs and Border Protection; Former Administrator, Drug Enforcement Administration, Andrés Rozental Former Deputy Foreign Minister of Mexico; Former President and Founder Mexican Council on Foreign Relations (COMEXI) “Managing the United States-Mexico Border: Cooperative Solutions to Common Challenges “ Report of the Binational Task Force on the United States-Mexico Border http://www.pacificcouncil.org/document.doc?id=30

The 1,952-mile land boundary between the United States and Mexico is the place where the most contentious and difficult issues in the bilateral relationship play out – from undocumented migration and contraband trafficking to the allocation of water in a thirsty region. Nevertheless, the border region remains poorly understood – both by policymakers in distant federal capitals and by the public at large. Most people who do not live along the border or cross it frequently are unaware of the challenges of border management or of the ways in which Mexico and the United States are attempting to meet those challenges. Changes on the ground – and local responses to them – frequently outpace both national policies and public perceptions. The conjunction of a technologically advanced, capital-rich society and a modernizing, labor-exporting country creates the potential for both synergy and strife. The challenge confronting Mexico and the United States is to mitigate the conflicts that inevitably arise from this dichotomy while seizing all potential opportunities the differences generate. We envision a system of border management that moves people and goods between the United States and Mexico far more quickly and efficiently than the present arrangement but that also enhances the security of both nations. This new system would facilitate trade, encourage the emergence of regional economic clusters, promote wise stewardship of shared natural resources, and enhance efforts to preserve ecosystems that cross the national boundary. Perhaps most importantly, it would invite communities that dot and span the frontier to exploit opportunities for mutual benefit. Ultimately, the border should be as “thin” and transparent as technologically and politically possible for those engaged in legitimate travel or commerce but difficult to penetrate for those engaged in criminal activity or unauthorized transit. Management of this shared boundary should serve as a model for binational collaboration in confronting shared challenges.

#### **Threat of terrorism is real**

CNS News ‘12

‘Terrorists Enter U.S. from Mexico ‘From Time to Time’. “http://cnsnews.com/news/article/napolitano-terrorists-enter-us-mexico-time-time#sthash.ToT2xw4C.dpuf. Edwin Mora. EJW.

(CNSNews.com) -- Homeland Security Secretary Janet Napolitano told Congress last week that terrorists intending to harm the American people enter the U.S. from Mexico “from time to time."¶ a July 25 hearing of the House Homeland Security Committee, Rep. Ron Barber (D-Ariz.) asked Napolitano: “As you know, Madam Secretary, there have been anecdotal reports about material evidence of the presence of terrorists along our southern border. My question is, is there any credible evidence that these reports are accurate and that terrorists are, in fact, crossing our southern border with the intent to do harm to the American people?”¶ Napolitano answered: “With respect, there have been--and the Ababziar matter would be one I would refer to that's currently being adjudicated in the criminal courts--from time to time, and we are constantly working against different and evolving threats involving various terrorist groups and various ways they may seek to enter the country.”¶ “What I can tell you, however, is that that southern border--the U.S.-Mexico border--is heavily, heavily staffed at record amounts of manpower, materiel, infrastructure and the like, and we are constantly making sure we're doing all we can to make that border as safe as possible,” she said.¶ An August 2009 audit by the Government Accountability Office that focused on Customs and Border Protection (CBP) checkpoints said that in fiscal 2008 CBP reported “there were three individuals encountered by the Border Patrol at southwest border checkpoints who were identified as persons linked to terrorism.”¶ In April 2010, CNSNews.com reported that FBI Director Robert Mueller told the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, “In Detroit, Mahmoud Youssef Kourani was indicted in the Eastern District of Michigan on one count of conspiracy to provide material support to Hezbollah. … Kourani was already in custody for entering the country illegally through Mexico and was involved in fundraising activities on behalf of Hezbollah.”¶ Five years ago, in an August 2007 interview with the El Paso Times, then-Director of National Intelligence Mike McConnell echoed what Napolitano told Congress last week about terrorist coming into the U.S. across the Mexican border.¶ “So, are terrorists coming across the Southwest border?” McConnell said in that interview. “Not in great numbers.”¶ “There are some cases?” asked the El Paso Times.¶ “There are some. And would they use it as a path, given it was available to them? In time they will,” said McConnell.¶ “If they're successful at it, then they'll probably repeat it,” asked the reporter.¶ “Sure,” said McConnell. “There were a significant number of Iraqis who came across last year. Smuggled across illegally.”¶ “Where was that?” asked the reporter.¶ “Across the Southwest border,” said McConnell.

#### **Border infrastructure is the vial internal link to US-Mexican Relations**

CSIS, 04 - Bipartisan domestic and foreign policy think tank, conducting policy studies and strategic analyses on political, economic and security issues (Center for Strategic and International Studies, “U.S.-Mexico Border Security and the Evolving Security Relationship,” U.S.-Mexico Binational Council, 4/15/04, http://csis.org/files/media/csis/pubs/0404\_bordersecurity.pdf)//AR

The flow of people and goods is already enormous and, barring unforeseeable calamities that could provoke major and continuing disruptions along the border, it will steadily grow as both economies expand and integrate. Given the enormous number of people and volumes of goods that legally—and illegally—cross the border in this age of international terrorism against innocent civilian targets, the multifarious dimensions of cross-border security have been elevated to an unprecedented level of importance in the United States.

There can be no doubt that the future of Mexico-U.S. relations will for the indefinite future be shaped to a large degree by how the two countries work together to manage, selectively inspect, and regulate cross-border traffic. One objective, which will perhaps be of equal importance in both countries, is that no attack on the United States be perpetrated from terrorist bases in Mexico or that no terrorists easily cross the border on their way to attacking U.S. targets. In the United States, it is highly unlikely that there will be any significant partisan political disagreements about these and related imperatives of border security. In short, this bilateral relationship is among the most strategically important the United States has anywhere in the world. The long, porous border and the practical impossibility of ever establishing mechanisms that could reliably monitor all of the human and material traffic across the border create a harrowing dilemma for U.S. officials in Congress and the executive branch. Perhaps the only certainty in this context is that greater and greater border and security cooperation will be called for.

Border is a key area for counter-terrorism – here are 7518 reasons

Murdock 4/25, Deroy Murdock, Media Fellow of The Hoover Institution on War, Revolution, and Peace at Stanford University, nationally syndicated columnist with the Scripps Howard News Service, 4/25/13, (“The Southern Border: Our Welcome Mat for Terrorists”, [http://www.nationalreview.com/article/346591/southern-border-our-welcome-mat-terrorists](http://www.nationalreview.com/article/346591/southern-border-our-welcome-mat-terrorists%22%20%5Ct%20%22_blank), AW)

 **There are** at least **7,518 reasons** **to** **get** the U.S./Mexican **border under control.** That equals the number of aliens apprehended in fiscal year 2011 from the four nations the U.S. government labels “state sponsers of terrorism” and ten additional “countries of interest.” Since January 2010, those flying into America via these 14 nations face enhanced screening; as the Transportation Security Administration announced, “Effective aviation security must begin beyond our borders.” U.S. national security merits at least that much vigilance on our borders.¶ The roaring immigration-reform debate this year largely addresses Hispanic aliens who illegally cross the border. Far more worrisome, however, are the thousands who break into America from countries “where we have concerns, particularly about al-Qaeda affiliates,” a top State Department official told CNN.¶ These include Cubans, Iranians, Sudanese, and Syrians whose governments are federally designated “state sponsors of terrorism.” As indicated by the latest information in Table 34 of Customs and Border Protection’s Immigration Yearbook 2011, 198 Sudanese were nabbed while penetrating the USA. Between FY 2002 and 2011, there were 1,207 such arrests. (These figures cover all U.S. borders, although, as Table 35 confirms, 96.3 percent of the overall detainee population intruded from Mexico.) Like other immigrants, most Sudanese seek better lives here. But some may be vectors for the same militant Islam that literally tore Sudan in two.¶ In FY 2011, 108 Syrians were stopped at our borders; over ten years, the number is 1,353. Syria is a key supporter of Hezbollah, and Bashar Assad’s unstable regime reportedly has attacked its domestic opponents with chemical weapons.¶ As for Iranians, 276 were caught in FY 2011, while 2,310 were captured over the previous ten years. Iran also backs Hezbollah, hates “the Great Satan,” and craves atomic weapons.¶ The other ten “countries of interest” are Algeria, Iraq, Lebanon, Libya, Yemen, and:¶ **Afghanistan**: The Taliban’s stronghold and current theater of America’s longest war. Afghans halted in FY 2011: 106. Prior ten fiscal years: 681.¶ **Nigeria**: The land of underwear bomber Umar Farouk Abdulmutallab suffers under sharia law in its northern provinces. Respective data: 591, 4,525.¶**Pakistan**: Hideaway of the Pakistani Taliban and the late Osama bin Laden. 525, 10,682.¶ **Saudi Arabia**: Generous benefactor of radical imams and militant mosques worldwide; birthplace of 15 of the 19 September 11 hijackers. 123, 986. **Somalia:** Home of Indian Ocean pirates and al-Qaeda’s al-Shabaab franchise. In October 1993, Islamic terrorists there shot down two Black Hawk helicopters, killed 18 U.S. soldiers, and dragged several of their bodies through Mogadishu’s streets. 323, 1,524.¶ At a Capitol Hill hearing last July, Homeland Security secretary Janet Napolitano conceded that terrorists enter the U.S. via the U.S./Mexican border “from time to time.”¶ The House Homeland Security Subcommittee on Oversight last November published A Line in the Sand: Countering Crime, Violence, and Terror at the Southwest Border. As this study explained:¶ The Congressional Research Service reports that between September 2001 and September 2012, there have been 59 homegrown violent jihadist plots within the United States. Of growing concern and potentially a more violent threat to American citizens is **the** **enhanced** **ability** **of** Middle East terrorist organizations, aided by their relationships and growing presence in the Western Hemisphere, to exploit the Southwest border to enter the United States undetected.¶ A Line in the Sand offers chilling portraits of some who treat the southern border as America’s welcome mat.¶ • On January 11, 2011, U.S. agents discovered Said Jaziri in a car trunk trying to enter near San Diego. Saidsaid that he had traveled from his native Tunisia to Tijuana and paid smugglers $5,000 to sneak him across the border. The French government previously convicted and deported Jaziri for assaulting a Muslim whom he considered insufficiently devout. In 2006, Jaziri advocated killing Danish cartoonist Kurt Westergaard for creating what Jaziri called sacrilegious drawings of the Prophet Mohammed.¶ • Somalia’s Ahmed Muhammed Dhakane told authorities in 2011 that he earned up to $75,000 per day **smuggling** East Africans into America. His clients included three al-Shabaab terrorists. As the House report states: “Dhakane cautioned that each of these individuals is ready to die for their cause and would fight against the United States if the jihad moved from overseas to the U.S. mainland.”¶ • On June 4, 2010, Anthony Joseph Tracy (a.k.a. Yusuf Noor) was convicted of conspiring to slip aliens into America. Tracy told federal investigators that Cuban diplomats used his travel agency in Kenya — Noor Services Ltd. — to transfer 272 Somalis to Havana. They proceeded to Belize, through Mexico, and then trespassed into the U.S. Tracy, who converted to Islam in prison in the 1990s, claims he refused to assist al-Shabaab. But officials discovered an e-mail in which he casually wrote: “i helped a lot of Somalis and most are good but there are some who are bad and i leave them to ALLAH . . . ”¶ And remember: These anecdotes and statistics involve individuals whom authorities intercepted. No details exist about aliens from these countries who successfully have infiltrated America.

**High risk – no tech barriers**

Kenneth C. **Brill 12**, is a former U.S. ambassador to the I.A.E.A. Kenneth N. Luongo is president of the Partnership for Global Security. Both are members of the Fissile Material Working Group, a nonpartisan nongovernmental organization. Nuclear Terrorism: A Clear Danger, [www.nytimes.com/2012/03/16/opinion/nuclear-terrorism-a-clear-danger.html?\_r=0](http://www.nytimes.com/2012/03/16/opinion/nuclear-terrorism-a-clear-danger.html?_r=0" \t "_blank)

Terrorists exploit **gaps in security**. The   current global regime for protecting the nuclear materials that terrorists desire for their ultimate weapon is far from seamless. It is based  largely on **unaccountable**, voluntary arrangements that are **inconsistent**across borders. Its **weak links make it dangerous and inadequate to prevent nuclear terrorism.**¶ Later this month in Seoul, the more than 50 world leaders who will gather for the second Nuclear Security Summit need to seize the opportunity to start developing an accountable regime to prevent nuclear terrorism.¶ There is **consensus** among international leaders that **the threat** of nuclear terrorism **is real**, not a Hollywood confection. President Obama, the leaders of 46 other nations, the heads of the International Atomic Energy Agency and the UnitedNations, and numerous experts have called nuclear terrorism one of the most serious threats to global security and stability. It is also **preventable with more aggressive action**.¶ At least four **terrorist groups**, including Al Qaeda, have demonstrated **interest** in using a nuclear device. These groups operate in or near states with histories of questionable nuclear security practices. Terrorists do not need to steal a nuclear weapon. **It is** quite **possible** quite to make an improvised nuclear device from  highly enriched uranium or plutonium being used for civilian purposes. And there is a black market uranium in such material. There have been 18 confirmed thefts or loss of weapons-usable nuclear material. In 2011, the Moldovan police broke up part of a smuggling ring attempting to sell highly enriched uranium; one member is thought to remain at large with a kilogram of this material.

LPOE protection prevents infiltration – it’s a hotspot of cooperation

Mariclaire Acosta et al 12 – Project Director, Freedom House – Mexico Bill Bratton Chairman, Kroll Advisory Solutions, former Chief of the Los Angeles Police Department and former New York City Police Commissioner Geoffrey Cowan President, The Annenberg Foundation Trust at Sunnylands John Engler President, Business Roundtable, former Governor of Michigan Rafael Fernández de Castro Chair, Department of International Studies, Instituto Tecnológico Autónomo de México, former Foreign Policy Advisor to President Calderón Michael Govan CEO and Wallis Annenberg Director, Los Angeles County Museum of Art Jane Harman Director, President, and CEO, Wilson Center, former Member of Congress Carlos Heredia Director of International Studies, Centro de Investigación y Docencia Económicas, CIDE, former Member of Congress Phil Heymann James Barr Ames Professor of Law, Harvard Law School, former Deputy Attorney General Barry Jackson Chief of Staff to the Speaker of the House John Boehner Enrique Krauze Historian and Essayist, Founder and Editor-in-Chief of Letras Libres Isaac Lee President, News, Univision Communications Inc. Emilio Lozoya Chairman, JFH Lozoya Investments Mel Martinez Chairman, Florida, Mexico, Central America and the Caribbean for JPMorgan Chase & Co., Chairman, JPMorgan Chase Foundation Doris Meissner Senior Fellow, Migration Policy Institute, former Commissioner of Immigration and Naturalization Service, (“Policy Recommendations for U.S.-Mexico Relations”, [http://sunnylands.org/files/posts/159/stronger\_f.pdf](http://sunnylands.org/files/posts/159/stronger_f.pdf%22%20%5Ct%20%22_blank), AW)

At the same time, the United States faces a major ¶ challenge in ensuring the safety of its citizens ¶ against terrorist attacks, and it depends significantly ¶ on intelligence sharing and law enforcement ¶ cooperation from its two neighbors, Mexico and ¶ Canada. Indeed, this cooperation has been one of ¶ the untold stories of engagement between U.S. and ¶ Mexican federal agencies over the past decade, ¶ with the result that the U.S.-Mexico border has ¶ not yet been used for terrorist activities. However, ¶ continued vigilance and more sophisticated forms ¶ of cooperation will be needed to avoid the evolving ¶ threats from terrorist organizations.

Indeed, one of the greatest opportunities for **bi-national cooperation on security**, which would help **address** both Mexican concerns about transnational organized crime and U.S. concerns about **terrorism**, would be **to** **develop** more **sophisticated approaches to** managing **ports of entry at the border**. By using risk management techniques and the latest technology, the two countries could develop more effective ways of detecting potential threats, ranging from drugs to firearms to bombs, and simultaneously facilitate commerce and the exchange of people across the border. While much attention has been focused on beefing up security between ports of entry, the reality is that most of **the real threats** to the two countries **are at the ports of entry** rather than between them. A **new focus on** these **could be a win-win for both countries** and for both security and trade. For the United States, Mexico is a key partner in ¶ international affairs. **Mexico works hard to protect ¶ the U**nited **S**tates **from terrorist threats** and to ¶ weaken transnational organized crime groups. It ¶ is a middle income country, currently holds the ¶ presidency of the G-20, and is expected to grow ¶ steadily for many years to come. Jim O’Neil of ¶ Goldman Sachs, for example, expects Mexico to have ¶ the seventh largest economy in the world by 2020. ¶ Mexico has long served as a bridge between the ¶ developed and developing worlds, and the U.S. can ¶ take advantage of this fact by working closely with ¶ Mexico on issues of common interest

Nuclear terrorism causes extinction –escalates to Russia and China

Ayson 10 – Robert Ayson 10, Professor of Strategic Studies and Director of the Centre for Strategic Studies: New Zealand at the Victoria University of Wellington, 2010 (“After a Terrorist Nuclear Attack: Envisaging Catalytic Effects,” Studies in Conflict & Terrorism, Volume 33, Issue 7, July, Available Online to Subscribing Institutions via InformaWorld)

A terrorist nuclear attack, and even the use of nuclear weapons in response by the country attacked in the first place, would not necessarily represent the worst of the nuclear worlds imaginable. Indeed, there are reasons to wonder whether nuclear terrorism should ever be regarded as belonging in the category of truly existential threats. A contrast can be drawn here with the global catastrophe that would come from a massive nuclear exchange between two or more of the sovereign states that possess these weapons in significant numbers. Even the worst terrorism that the twenty-first century might bring would fade into insignificance alongside considerations of what a general nuclear war would have wrought in the Cold War period. And it must be admitted that as long as the major nuclear weapons states have hundreds and even thousands of nuclear weapons at their disposal, there is always the possibility of a truly awful nuclear exchange taking place precipitated entirely by state possessors themselves. But these two nuclear worlds—a non-state actor nuclear attack and a catastrophic interstate nuclear exchange—are not necessarily separable. It is just possible thatsome sort of terrorist attack, and especially an act of nuclear terrorism, could precipitate a chain of events leading to a massive exchange of nuclear weapons between two or more of the states that possess them. In this context, today’s and tomorrow’s terrorist groups might assume the place allotted during the early Cold War years to new state possessors of small nuclear arsenals who were seen as raising the risks of a catalytic nuclear war between the superpowers started by third parties. These risks were considered in the late 1950s and early 1960s as concerns grew about nuclear proliferation, the so-called n+1 problem. It may require a considerable amount of imagination to depict an especially plausible situation where **an act of nuclear terrorism could lead to such a massive inter-state nuclear war**. For example, in the event of a terrorist nuclear attack on the United States, it might well be wondered just how Russia and/or China could plausibly be brought into the picture, not least because they seem unlikely to be fingered as the most obvious state sponsors or encouragers of terrorist groups. They would seem far too responsible to be involved in supporting that sort of terrorist behavior that could just as easily threaten them as well. Some possibilities, however remote, do suggest themselves. For example, how might the United States react if it was thought or discovered that the fissile material used in the act of nuclear terrorism had come from Russian stocks,40 and if for some reason Moscow denied any responsibility for nuclear laxity? The correct attribution of that nuclear material to a particular country might not be a case of science fiction given the observation by Michael May et al. that while the debris resulting from a nuclear explosion would be “spread over a wide area in tiny fragments, its radioactivity makes it detectable, identifiable and collectable, and a wealth of information can be obtained from its analysis: the efficiency of the explosion, the materials used and, most important … some indication of where the nuclear material came from.”41 Alternatively, if the act of nuclear terrorism came as a complete surprise, and American officials refused to believe that a terrorist group was fully responsible (or responsible at all) suspicion would shift immediately to state possessors**.** Ruling out Western ally countries like the United Kingdom and France, and probably Israel and India as well, authorities in Washington would be left with a very short list consisting of North Korea, perhapsIran if its program continues, and possibly Pakistan**.** But at what stage would Russia and China be definitely ruled out in this high stakes game of nuclear Cluedo? In particular, if the act of nuclear terrorism occurred against a backdrop of existing tension in Washington’s relations with Russia and/or China, and at a time when threats had already been traded between these major powers, would officials and political **leaders** not be tempted to assume the worst? Of course, the chances of this occurring would only seem to increase if the United States was already involved in some sort of limited armed conflict with Russia and/or China, or if they were confronting each other from a distance in a proxy war, as unlikely as these developments may seem at the present time. The reverse might well apply too: should a nuclear terrorist attack occur in Russia or China during a period of heightened tension or even limited conflict with the United States, could Moscow and Beijing resist the pressures that might rise domestically to consider the United States as a possible perpetrator or encourager of the attack? Washington’s early response to a terrorist nuclear attack on its own soil might also raise the possibility of an unwanted (and nuclear aided) confrontation with Russia and/or China. For example, in the noise and confusion during the immediate aftermath of the terrorist nuclear attack, the U.S. president might be expected to place the country’s armed forces, including its nuclear arsenal, on a higher stage of alert. In such a tense environment, when careful planning runs up against the friction of reality, it is just possible that Moscow and/or China might mistakenly read this as a sign of U.S. intentions to use force (and possibly nuclear force) against them. In that situation, the temptations to preempt such actions might grow, although it must be admitted that any preemption would probably still meet with a devastating response. As part of its initial response to the act of nuclear terrorism(as discussed earlier)Washington might decide to order a significant conventional (or nuclear) retaliatory or disarming attack against the leadership of the terrorist group and/or states seen to support that group. Depending on the identity and especially the location of these targets, Russia and/or China might interpret such action as being far too close for their comfort, and potentially as an infringement on their spheres of influence and even on their sovereignty. One far-fetched but perhaps not impossible scenario might stem from a judgment in Washington that some of the main aiders and abetters of the terrorist action resided somewhere such as Chechnya, perhaps in connection with what Allison claims is the “Chechen insurgents’ … long-standing interest in all things nuclear.”42 American pressure on that part of the world would almost certainly raise alarms in Moscow that might require a degree of advanced consultation from Washington that the latter found itself unable or unwilling to provide. There is also the question of how other nuclear-armed states respond to the act of nuclear terrorism on another member of that special club. It could reasonably be expected that following a nuclear terrorist attack on the United States, both Russia and China would extend immediate sympathy and support to Washington and would work alongside the United States in the Security Council. But there is just a chance, albeit a slim one, where the support of Russia and/or China is less automatic in some cases than in others. For example, what would happen if the United States wished to discuss its right to retaliate against groups based in their territory? If, for some reason, Washington found the responses of Russia and China deeply underwhelming, (neither “for us or against us”) might it also suspect that they secretly were in cahoots with the group, increasing (again perhaps ever so slightly) the chances of a major exchange. If the terrorist group had some connections to groups in Russia and China, or existed in areas of the world over which Russia and China held sway, and if Washington felt that Moscow or Beijing were placing a curiously modest level of pressure on them, what conclusions might it then draw about their culpability? If Washington decided to use, or decided to threaten the use of, nuclear weapons, the responses of Russia and China would be crucial to the chances of avoiding a more serious nuclear exchange. They might surmise, for example, that while the act of nuclear terrorism was especially heinous and demanded a strong response, the response simply had to remain below the nuclear threshold. It would be one thing for a non-state actor to have broken the nuclear use taboo, but an entirely different thing for a state actor, and indeed the leading state in the international system, to do so. If Russia and China felt sufficiently strongly about that prospect, there is then the question of what options would lie open to them to dissuade the United States from such action: and as has been seen over the last several decades, the central dissuader of the use of nuclear weapons by states has been the threat of nuclear retaliation. If some readers find this simply too fanciful, and perhaps even offensive to contemplate, it may be informative to reverse the tables. Russia, which possesses an arsenal of thousands of nuclear warheads and that has been one of the two most important trustees of the non-use taboo, is subjected to an attack of nuclear terrorism. In response, Moscow places its nuclear forces very visibly on a higher state of alert and declares that it is considering the use of nuclear retaliation against the group and any of its state supporters. How would Washington view such a possibility? Would it really be keen to support Russia’s use of nuclear weapons, including outside Russia’s traditional sphere of influence? And if not, which seems quite plausible, what options would Washington have to communicate that displeasure? If China had been the victim of the nuclear terrorism and seemed likely to retaliate in kind, would the United States and Russia be happy to sit back and let this occur? In the charged atmosphere immediately after a nuclear terrorist attack, how would the attacked country respond to pressure from other major nuclear powers not to respond in kind? The phrase “how dare they tell us what to do” immediately springs to mind. Some might even go so far as to interpret this concern as a tacit form of sympathy or support for the terrorists. This might not help the chances of nuclear restraint.

## 1AC Trade Adv.

U.S.-Mexico trade is set to expand, but border congestion makes the relationship unsustainable — the plan boosts U.S. manufacturing and overall competitiveness.

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Commerce between the United States and Mexico is one of the great — yet underappreciated — success stories of the global economy. In 2011 U.S.-Mexico goods and services trade reached the major milestone of one-half trillion dollars with virtually no recognition. The United States is Mexico's top trading partner, and Mexico — which has gained macroeconomic stability and expanded its middle class over the last two decades — is the United States' second largest export market and third largest trading partner.¶ Seventy percent of bilateral commerce crosses the border via trucks, meaning the border region is literally where "the rubber hits the road" for bilateral relations. This also means that not only California and Baja California, but also Michigan and Michoacán, all have a major stake in efficient and secure border management.¶ The quantity of U.S.-Mexico trade is impressive, but its quality makes it unique. The United States and Mexico do not just sell goods to one another, they actually work together to manufacture them. Through production sharing, materials and parts often cross back and forth between factories on each side of the border as a final product is made and assembled. As a result, U.S. imports from Mexico contain, on average, 40 percent U.S. content, and Mexico's imports from the U.S. also have a high level of Mexican content.¶ This system of joint production has two important consequences. First, it means that our economies are profoundly linked. We tend to experience growth and recession together, and productivity gains or losses on one side of the border generally cause a corresponding gain or loss in competitiveness on the other side as well. Second, the fact that goods often cross the border several times as they are being produced creates a multiplier effect for gains and losses in border efficiency. Whereas goods from China only go through customs and inspection once as they enter the U.S. or Mexico, products built by regional manufacturers bear the costs of long and unpredictable border wait times and significant customs requirements each time they cross the U.S.-Mexico border.¶ Corridors in Crisis¶ This trade relationship requires major infrastructure to function effectively. The largest trade corridor, often referred to as the NASCO corridor, links central and eastern Mexico to Texas, the American Midwest, Northeast, and Ontario, utilizing the key Laredo-Nuevo Laredo ports of entry (POEs). Other important trade arteries include the CANAMEX Corridor, which connects western Mexico to the intermountain United States and Canadian province of Alberta, as well as the shorter but high-volume I-5 corridor connecting California to Baja California. As the economies of both the U.S. and Mexico grow, it is likely that this network of freight transportation infrastructure — and the land POEs that serve as nodes in this network — will experience added stress.¶ Unfortunately, the infrastructure and capacity of the ports of entry to process goods and individuals entering the United States has not kept pace with the expansion of bilateral trade or the population growth of the border region. Instead, the need for greater border security following the terrorist attacks of 9/11 led to a thickening of the border, dividing the twin cities that characterize the region and adding costly, long and unpredictable wait times for commercial and personal crossers alike. Congestion acts as a drag on the competitiveness of the region and of the United States and Mexico in their entirety. Solutions are needed that strengthen both border security and efficiency at the same time.¶ The integrated nature of the North American manufacturing sector makes eliminating border congestion an important way to enhance regional competitiveness. The global economic crisis forced manufacturers to look for ways to cut costs. After taking into consideration factors such as rising fuel costs, increasing wages in China and the ability to automate an ever greater portion of the production process, many American companies decided to nearshore factories to Mexico or reshore them to the United States, taking advantage of strong human capital and shorter supply chains. Bilateral trade dropped significantly during the recession but has since rebounded strongly, growing significantly faster than trade with China.¶ But the growth of trade continues to add pressure on the already strained POEs and transportation corridors. Several studies have attempted to quantify the costs of border area congestion to the economies of the United States and Mexico. In what is perhaps a testimony to the fragmented and geographically disperse nature of the border region, most of these studies have focused on particular North-South corridors of traffic and trade rather than taking a comprehensive, border-wide approach. The specific results of the studies (see table on p. 108) are quite varied. Nonetheless, one message comes through quite clearly — long and unpredictable wait times at the POEs are costing the United States and Mexican economies many billions of dollars each year.¶ Moderate investments to update infrastructure and to fully staff the ports of entry are certainly needed, as long lines and overworked staff promote neither efficiency nor security. But in a time of tight federal budgets, asking for more resources cannot be the only answer. Strategic efforts that do more with less, improving efficiency and reducing congestion, are also needed. Trusted traveler and shipper programs (i.e. the Global Entry programs, which includes programs such as SENTRI, FAST, C-TPAT) allow vetted, low-risk individuals and shipments expedited passage across the border.¶ Common Voice¶ Improving these programs and significantly expanding enrollment could increase throughput with minimal investments in infrastructure and staffing — all while strengthening security by giving border officials more time to focus on unknown and potentially dangerous individuals and shipments. The development of the 21st Century Border initiative by the Obama and Calderón administrations has yielded some advances in this direction, but the efforts need to be redoubled.¶ The 1990s were the decade of NAFTA and skyrocketing trade. The 2000s saw security concerns grow and recession struck. The new decade has only just begun, but the potential is there for a resurgence of competitiveness and regional integration. There are strong ideas — including trusted traveler and shipper programs, preclearance, customs harmonization, and public-private partnerships — that have enormous potential.

Infrastructure investment facilitates trade

Rozental et al 10 (Andrés Rozental,¶ Former Deputy Foreign Minister of ¶ Mexico; Former President and Founder ¶ Mexican Council on Foreign Relations ¶ (COMEXI), Robert C. Bonner, Former Commissioner of U.S. Customs and Border Protection; Former Administrator, Drug Enforcement Administration, Chappell Lawson, Associate Professor of Political Science, Massachusetts Institute of Technology; Adjunct Fellow, Pacific Council on International Policy , “Managing the United States-Mexico Border: ¶ Cooperative Solutions to Common Challenges,” 2010 http://www.pacificcouncil.org/document.doc?id=30, RLA)

Congestion at crossing points imposes considerable costs on tourists, commuters, ¶ consumers, business owners, and border communities; the financial price alone of ¶ delays at the border reaches billions of dollars per year. In some areas along the ¶ border, including the San Diego-Tijuana corridor, expediting cross-border commerce is ¶ the single most important measure that the governments could take to promote ¶ economic development. ¶ Although facilitation is often viewed as the flip side of security, there are ways to ¶ simultaneously expedite trade and improve security. For instance, new detection ¶ technologies and intelligent risk management strategies enhance public safety while ¶ facilitating cross-border travel and commerce. ¶ One crucial barrier to trade facilitation is the deficit in border infrastructure, which ¶ simply has not kept pace with massive increases in trade and transit since ratification of ¶ the NorthAmericanFreeTradeAgreement**.** Federal spending on ports of entry would ¶ have a very high rate of return; for this reason, both countries should make a long-term ¶ commitment to fund border infrastructure and (in the short run) disproportionately ¶ direct stimulus money toward the ports of entry. ¶ Even with additional stimulus spending, however, federal funding will remain insufficient ¶ to address the infrastructure deficit; both countries must find other sources of financing ¶ for border crossing points and the roads that feed into them. This money can come in ¶ part from the private sector, with the market rather than the state determining the ¶ magnitude of private investment in border infrastructure. ¶ Beyond infrastructure, better exploitation of technology, refined risk-based ¶ segmentation of traffic, and operational changes at the ports of entry (including ¶ staffing) can all reduce transit time. Because the marginal cost of operating an existing ¶ port of entry is extremely low compared to both the cost of building a new port of entry ¶ and the marginal benefit of more rapid transit, inadequate staffing of the ports of entry ¶ should never become a bottleneck. ¶ So far neither government has articulated a goal for wait times. The Task Force believes ¶ that average wait times at the border should not exceed 20 minutes in either direction, ¶ at any port of entry, with minimal variation about this average.

Cross-border trade catalyzes biotech innovation — that spreads globally and establishes an international model

SDD 7 — San Diego Dialogue, a division of University of California San Diego Extension, contributing to the advancement of research, relationships and solutions to the San Diego-Baja California crossborder region's long-term challenges in innovation, economy, health and education. As a part of the University of California, San Diego (UCSD), Division of Extended Studies and Public Programs, the Dialogue is an entirely self-funded public policy organization (San Diego Dialogue, *Crossborder Group Inc.*, June 2007, “Borderless Biotech & Mexico’s Emerging Life Sciences Industry”, <http://www.sandiegodialogue.org/pdfs/Borderless_Biotech.pdf>, Accessed 07-26-2013 | AK)

This document is yet another part of a continuing effort to describe Mexico’s evolution in technology and science. Clearly, certain intriguing crossborder opportunities appear to exist in the case of life sciences – whether in ag-biotech, biocontrols, genomics research, pharmaceutical manufacturing, medical devices, or clinical trials. While all of Mexico cannot expect to immediately become a world-leader in all areas of this sector, its history already shows examples of regional genius and connections with California’s biotech and pharmaceutical industries. The question remains: can this history be expanded upon - and will it include San Diego? Given that San Diego has the largest concentration of US-based biotechnology firms along the US-Mexico border and one of the largest in the United States, there is a strong case and a unique opportunity to work with the dynamic regions that make up Mexico’s emerging life sciences industry. Direct flights from both San Diego’s or Tijuana’s airports to these regions provides access that few other locations in the United States can take advantage of. The broad use of English by many of Mexico’s technology leaders eliminates yet another barrier to increased interaction, scientific collaboration, and possibly investment. Such an opportunity, first discussed in Borderless Innovation, can help act as a catalyst for both increasing multi-regional competitiveness in life science companies, as well as accelerate Mexico’s growth in this sector. Just as the strength of a helix is based on the connections between its components, so too the potential for San Diego to become both a portal and a partner for Mexico's emerging life sciences regions creates opportunities for each side of the crossborder region. Joining together the talent and capabilities of San Diego, Guanajuato, Jalisco, Morelos, Nuevo León, and Baja California in the development of a life sciences partnership may create a unique, international model that goes beyond borders. Ultimately, such a partnership might also extend to many other regions – in the US, Mexico, Canada, Europe and Asia – supporting new job growth, new discoveries, and a world of borderless biotech.

Biotech solves food shortages that are coming from climate change

Doyle ’08

(Alister Doyle is Reuter’s Environmental Correspondent. “Biotechnology seen as a key to solving food crisis.” *Reuters.* <http://www.reuters.com/article/2008/06/03/us-food-summit-biotech-idUSL0356693120080603>. June 3rd, 2008. EJW.)

(Reuters) - Biotechnology can help solve the world's food crisis with benefits such as flood-resistant rice in Bangladesh or higher cotton yields in Burkina Faso, a senior U.S. official said at a U.N. food summit on Tuesday.¶ "Biotechnology is one of the most promising tools for improving the productivity of agriculture and increasing the incomes of the rural poor," U.S. Agriculture Secretary Ed Schafer said.¶ "We are convinced of the benefits it offers to developing countries and small farmers," he told a U.S.-led briefing on the sidelines of the June 3-5 summit seeking ways to combat high food prices when climate change may aggravate shortages.¶ Some green groups say genetically-engineered crops threaten biodiversity while many European consumers are wary of eating products dubbed by critics as "Frankenfoods".¶ Schafer said biotechnology, including genetically-modified organisms (GMOs), could help produce more food by raising yields and producing crops in developing nations that are resistant to disease and pests.¶ "Genetic engineering offers long-term solutions to some of our major crop production problems," said Philippine Agriculture Minister Arthur Yap. But he said that it was not a panacea for all of his country's agricultural problems.¶ Progress being made in the Philippines included research into rice and coconuts resistant to disease, he said.¶ "We're also working on virus-resistant papaya, papaya hybrids with a longer shelf life that should be ready for market in 2009," he said.¶ Climate change could aggravate production around the world with more droughts, floods, disruptions to monsoons and rising sea levels, says the U.N. Climate Panel. In Africa alone, 250 million people could face extra stress on water supplies by 2020.¶ COTTON¶ Burkina Faso Agriculture Minister Laurent Sedogo said the African country had worked with U.S. agriculture group Monsanto to battle pests that blighted the cotton crop.¶ "We are about to plant 15,000 hectares" of a new crop that was resistant to pests, he said. That would also cut down on the use of pesticides that could damage the health of farmers.¶ The World Bank and aid agencies estimate that soaring food prices could push as many as 100 million more people into hunger. About 850 million are already hungry.¶ Bangladesh said that it was going ahead with efforts to make crops able to survive floods and more salinity in the soil.¶ A cyclone last year "is a wake-up call for all of us", said C.S. Karim, an adviser to Bangladesh's agriculture ministry. "It shows the vulnerability of Bangladesh. "

World War III results as countries use weapons to fight for food

Calvin 1998 (William H.; Professor of Psychiatry and Behavioral Sciences – University of Washington) January "The Great Climate Flip-Flop" Atlantic Monthly 281:1 EBSCO

The population-crash scenario is surely the most appalling. Plummeting crop yields would cause some powerful countries to try to take over their neighbors or distant lands – if only because their armies, unpaid and lacking food, would go marauding, both at home and across the borders. The better-organized countries would attempt to use their armies, before they fell apart entirely, to take over countries with significant remaining resources, driving out or starving their inhabitants if not using modern weapons to accomplish the same end: eliminating competitors for the remaining food. This would be a worldwide problem – and could lead to a Third World War – but Europe's vulnerability is particularly easy to analyze. The last abrupt cooling, the Younger Dryas, drastically altered Europe's climate as far east as Ukraine. Present-day Europe has more than 650 million people. It has excellent soils, and largely grows its own food. It could no longer do so if it lost the extra warming from the North Atlantic.

Trade solves all the incentives for war

Griswold 11 Daniel Griswold is director of the Center for Trade Policy Studies at the Cato Institute and author of Mad about Trade: Why Main Street America Should Embrace Globalization. “Free Trade and the Global Middle Class,” Hayek Society Journal Vol. 9. http://www.cato.org/pubs/articles/Hayek-Society-Journal-Griswold.pdf

Our more globalized world has also yielded a “peace dividend.” It may not be obvious when our daily news cycles are dominated by horrific images from the Gaza Strip, Afghanistan and Libya, but our more globalized world has somehow become a more peaceful world. The number of civil and international wars has dropped sharply in the past 15 years, along with battle deaths. The reasons behind the retreat of war are complex, but again the spread of trade and globalization have played a key role. Trade has been seen as a friend of peace for centuries. In the 19th century, British statesman Richard Cobden pursued free trade as a way not only to bring more affordable bread to English workers but also to promote peace with Britain’s neighbors. He negotiated the Cobden-Chevalier free trade agreement with France in 1860 that helped to cement an enduring alliance between two countries that had been bitter enemies for centuries. In the 20th century, President Franklin Roosevelt’s secretary of state, Cordell Hull, championed Iower trade barriers as a way to promote peaceful commerce and reduce international tensions. Hull had witnessed first-hand the economic nationalism and retribution after World War I. Hull believed that “unhampered trade dovetail[s] with peace; high tariffs, trade barriers and unfair economic competition, with war. Hull was awarded the 1945 Nobel Prize for Peace, in part because of his work to promote global trade. Free trade and globalization have promoted peace in three main ways. First, trade and globalization have reinforced the trend towards democracy, and democracies tend not to pick fights with each other. A second and even more potent way that trade has promoted peace is by raising the cost of war. As national economies have become more intertwined, those nations have more to lose should war break out. War in a globalized world not only means the loss of human lives and tax dollars, but also ruptured trade and investment ties that impose lasting damage on the economy. Trade and economic integration has helped to keep the peace in Europe for more than 60 years. More recently, deepening economic ties between Mainland China and Taiwan are drawing those two governments closer together and helping to keep the peace. Leaders on both sides of the Taiwan Straight seem to understand that reckless nationalism would jeopardize the dramatic economic progress that region has enjoyed. A third reason why free trade promotes peace is because it has reduced the spoils of war. Trade allows nations to acquire wealth through production and exchange rather than conquest of territory and resources. As economies develop, wealth is increasingly measured in terms of intellectual property, financial assets, and human capital. Such assets cannot be easily seized by armies. In contrast, hard assets such as minerals and farmland are becoming relatively less important in high-tech, service economies. If people need resources outside their national borders, say oil or timber or farm products, they can acquire them peacefully by freely trading what they can produce best at home. The world today is harvesting the peaceful fruit of expanding trade. The first half of 20th century was marred by two devastating wars among great powers of Europe. In the ashes of World War II, the United States helped found the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade in 1947, the precursor to the WTO that helped to spur trade between the United States and its major trading partners. As a condition to Marshall Plan aid, the U.S. government also insisted that the continental European powers, France, Germany, and Italy, eliminate trade barriers between themselves in what was to become the European Common Market. One purpose of the common market was to spur economic development, of course, but just as importantly, it was meant to tie the Europeans together economically. With six decades of hindsight, the plan must be considered a spectacular success. The notion of another major war between France, Germany and other Western European powers is unimaginable. Compared to past eras, our time is one of relative world peace. According to the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, the number of armed conflicts around the world has dropped sharply in the past two decades. Virtually all the conflicts today are civil and guerilla wars. The spectacle of two governments sending armies off to fight in the battlefield has become rare. In the decade from 1998 through 2007, only three actual wars were fought between states: Erithrea-Ethiopia in 1998-2000, India-Pakistan in 1998-2003, and the United States-Iraq in 2003. From 2004 through 2007, no two nations were at war with one another. Civil wars have ended or at least ebbed in Aceh (in Indonesia), Angola, Burundi, Congo, Liberia, Nepal, Timor-Leste and Sierra Leone. Coming to the same conclusion is the Human Security Centre at the University of British Colombia in Canada. In a 2005 report, it documented a sharp decline in the number of armed conflicts, genocides and refuge numbers in the past 20 years. The average number of deaths per conflict has fallen from 38,000 in 1950 to 600 in 2002. Most armed conflicts in the world now take place in Sub-Saharan Africa, and the only form of political violence that has worsened in recent years in international terrorism. Many causes lie behind the good news--the end of the Cold War, the spread of democracy, and peacekeeping efforts by the major powers among them—but expanding trade and globalization appear to be playing a major role in promoting world peace. In a chapter in the 2005 Economic Freedom of the World Report, Dr. Erik Gartzke of Columbia University compared the propensity of countries to engage in wars to their level of economic freedom. He came to the conclusion that economic freedom, including the freedom to trade, significantly decreases the probability that a country will experience a military dispute with another country. Through econometric analysis, he found that, “Making economies freer translates into making countries more peaceful. At the extremes, the least free states are about 14 times as conflict prone as the most free.” A 2006 study for the Institute for the Study of Labor in Bonn, Germany, found that the same pacific effect of trade and globalization. Authors Solomon Polachek and Carlos Seiglie found that “trading nations cooperate more and fight less.” In fact, a doubling of trade reduces the probability that a country will be involved in a conflict by 20 percent. Trade was the most important channel for peace, they found, but investment flows also has a positive effect. A democratic form of government also proved to be a force for peace, but primarily because democracies trade more. All this helps explain why the world’s two most conflict-prone regions—the Arab Middle East and Sub-Saharan Africa—are also the world’s two least globally and economically integrated regions. Terrorism does not spring from poverty but from ideological fervor and political and economic frustration. If we want to blunt the appeal of radical ideology to the next generation of Muslim children coming of age, we can help create more economic opportunity in those societies by encouraging more trade and investment ties in the West. The U.S. initiative to enact free trade agreements with certain Muslim countries, such as Morocco, Jordan, Bahrain and Oman, represent small steps in the right direction. An even more effective policy would be to unilaterally open Western markets to products made and grown in Muslim countries. A young man or woman with a real job at export-oriented factory making overcoats in Jordan or shorts in Egypt is less vulnerable to the appeal of an Al-Qaida recruiter. Of course, free trade and globalization do not guarantee peace or inoculation against terrorism, anymore than they guarantee democracy and civil liberty. Hot-blooded nationalism and ideological fervor can overwhelm cold economic calculations. Any relationship involving human beings will be messy and non-linear. There will always be exceptions and outliers in such complex relationships involving economies and governments. But deeper trade and investment ties among nations have made it more likely that democracy and civil liberties will take root, and less likely those gains will be destroyed by civil conflict and war.

Trade wars cause global war

Spicer, Olin Foundation, 96 (The Challenge from the East and the Rebirth of the West, p. 121)

The choice facing the West today is much the same as that which faced the Soviet bloc after World War II: between meeting head-on the challenge of world trade with the adjustments and the benefits that it will bring, or of attempting to shut out markets that are growing and where a dynamic new pace is being set for innovative production. The problem about the second approach is not simply that it won’t hold: satellite technology alone will ensure that consumers will begin to demand those goods that the East is able to provide most cheaply. More fundamentally, it will guarantee the emergence of a fragmented world in which natural fears will be fanned and inflamed. A world divided intorigidtrade blocs will be a deeply troubled and unstable place in which suspicion and ultimately envy will possibly erupt into a major war. I do not say that the converse will necessarily be true, that in a free trading world there will be an absence of all strife. Such a proposition would manifestly be absurd. But to trade is to become interdependent, and that is a good stop in the direction of world stability. With nuclear weapons at two a penny, stability will be at a premium in the years ahead.

Trade decreases social pressure for war

Eiras, ‘4 [Ana Isabel, Senior Policy Analyst at the Heritage Foundation, “Why America Needs to Support Free Trade” http://www.heritage.org/Research/TradeandForeignAid/bg1761.cfm]

Free trade fosters an enormous chain of economic activity, the benefits of which culminate in a social desire to be at peace with neighboring and even faraway nations with which trade is conducted or might be conducted in the future. When individuals see how beneficial it is to live in an economically free society; when they see how freedom allows them to improve their lives and those of their families; when they can create new businesses, engage in commerce, or work for a decent salary or wage, adding dignity to their lives, they want peace to preserve all these good things. By contrast, when people live under economic oppression and are at the mercy of a small ruling authority that dictates every aspect of their lives and limits their ability to realize their potential, they resent the life they have and learn to hate better lives elsewhere. If they cannot enjoy the fruits of their efforts and cannot realize their potential; if they cannot feel free to do business, work freely, and trade freely; if they do not have anything to gain or to lose, they begin to feel that any change--even war--might be better. They have no incentive to desire peace with their neighbors. For this reason, the areas of greatest conflict in the world also happen to be those that are economically repressed. (See Map.) The Economic Freedom Map, drawn annually from the Index, shows, for example, that countries that are the most economically repressed have also suffered civil wars and unrest. The areas of the Middle East in which civil wars and terrorist havens abound are both economically repressed and mostly unfree. North Korea, a country plagued by starvation and poverty, is repressed. Brazil, Argentina, parts of Africa, and some former Soviet republics--all mostly unfree--have high levels of poverty and periodically suffer political and economic crises.

Trade creates a forum for peaceful dispute settlement

O’Driscoll and Fitzgerald 2 [Dr. Gerald P. O'Driscoll, Jr., is former Director of, and Sara J. Fitzgerald is a Trade Policy Analyst in, the Center for International Trade and Economics at The Heritage Foundation. December 18, 2002 <http://www.heritage.org/Research/TradeandForeignAid/BG1617.cfm> Accessed on 7-29-03]

Countries that trade with each other are less likely to engage in actions that would disrupt economic opportunity. Many trade agreements create a forum for the settlement of disputes, thereby reducing tension among the parties to the agreement. While the benefits of engaging in trade agreements to foster diplomacy between countries are clear, they also extend to reinforcing existing relationships. The U.S. Trade Representative is currently completing negotiations for an FTA with Singapore and has recently finished negotiations with Chile. Completing these agreements is an important element of a trade agenda.

Trade wars escalate – history on our side

Miller and Elwood ‘88

[Vince and James. Founder of the International Society for Individual Liberty and ISIL VP. “Free Trade or Protectionism?” [www.isil.org](http://www.isil.org), 1988]

In Trade Wars: Both Sides Lose When the government of Country "A" puts up trade barriers against the goods of Country "B", the government of Country "B" will naturally retaliate by erecting trade barriers against the goods of Country "A". The result? A trade war in which both sides lose. But all too often a depressed economy is not the only negative outcome of a trade war . . . When Goods Don't Cross Borders, Armies Often Do      History is not lacking in examples of cold trade wars escalating into hot shooting wars: Europe suffered from almost non-stop wars during the 17th and 18th centuries, when restrictive trade policy (mercantilism) was the rule; rival governments fought each other to expand their empires and to exploit captive markets. British tariffs provoked the American colonists to revolution, and later the Northern-dominated US government imposed restrictions on Southern cotton exports – a major factor leading to the American Civil War. In the late 19th Century, after a half century of general free trade (which brought a half-century of peace), short-sighted politicians throughout Europe again began erecting trade barriers. Hostilities built up until they eventually exploded into World War I. In 1930, facing only a mild recession, US President Hoover ignored warning pleas in a petition by 1028 prominent economists and signed the notorious Smoot-Hawley Act, which raised some tariffs to 100% levels. Within a year, over 25 other governments had retaliated by passing similar laws. The result? World trade came to a grinding halt, and the entire world was plunged into the "Great Depression" for the rest of the decade. The depression in turn led to World War II. The #1 Danger To World Peace. The world enjoyed its greatest economic growth during the relatively free trade period of 1945-1970, a period that also saw no major wars. Yet we again see trade barriers being raised around the world by short-sighted politicians. Will the world again end up in a shooting war as a result of these economically-deranged policies? Can we afford to allow this to happen in the nuclear age? "What generates war is the economic philosophy of nationalism: embargoes, trade and foreign exchange controls, monetary devaluation, etc. The philosophy of protectionism is a philosophy of war."

Trade wars cause global war

Spicer, Olin Foundation, 96 (The Challenge from the East and the Rebirth of the West, p. 121)

The choice facing the West today is much the same as that which faced the Soviet bloc after World War II: between meeting head-on the challenge of world trade with the adjustments and the benefits that it will bring, or of attempting to shut out markets that are growing and where a dynamic new pace is being set for innovative production. The problem about the second approach is not simply that it won’t hold: satellite technology alone will ensure that consumers will begin to demand those goods that the East is able to provide most cheaply. More fundamentally, it will guarantee the emergence of a fragmented world in which natural fears will be fanned and inflamed. A world divided intorigidtrade blocs will be a deeply troubled and unstable place in which suspicion and ultimately envy will possibly erupt into a major war. I do not say that the converse will necessarily be true, that in a free trading world there will be an absence of all strife. Such a proposition would manifestly be absurd. But to trade is to become interdependent, and that is a good stop in the direction of world stability. With nuclear weapons at two a penny, stability will be at a premium in the years ahead.

## 1AC Manufacturing Adv.

Scenario 1: Chinese Manufacturing

Rising labor costs mean China is on the cusp of transitioning to high-skill manufacturing

Rein ’10 [August 24, 2010. Shaun Rein is the founder and managing director of the China Market Research Group, a strategic market intelligence firm. “Three Big Trends Changing China For Multinationals” Forbes. <http://www.forbes.com/2010/08/24/china-multinationals-branding-leadership-careers-rein.html>]

Chinese companies increasingly knowing how to brand is one of three big trends multinationals need to stay on top of now. The second is rising labor costs. Many people are surprised that Chinese workers in factories from Toyota to Honda have begun demanding higher salaries and better working conditions. They shouldn’t be. Rising labor costs are not a short-term trend. They are an ongoing phenomenon, and they are why apparel makers have been relocating production to Indonesia, Vietnam and other lower-priced markets for years. Pricing pressures will continue. Why the shift? First, there is a demographic change taking place. Because of the one-child policy that China implemented in the late 1970s, there are fewer younger workers in the labor pool. Second, young Chinese are optimistic about their futures. They have seen their country emerge as an economic superpower, and they feel they deserve a piece of the pie. They want to buy Estée Lauder cosmetics, Zara clothes, Nokia phones and their own homes too. They need high salaries to lead the lives they want and are less willing to work at low-wage or blue-collar jobs. A decade ago there were only 1 million Chinese graduating from universities each year. This year, there were more than 6 million, and they all see their path to prosperity in white-collar jobs. To combat rising wages and real estate costs, companies have to either relocate manufacturing capabilities to lower-cost countries, automate their production facilities and move up the value chain or relocate factories to China’s western and central regions, where wages remain relatively low. Foxconn, which makes products for Apple , Dell and Hewlett-Packard and which received heavy criticism this year for its poor working conditions, has shut many of its facilities in southern China and is relocating 300,000 workers further inland to central China, closer to the homes of many of them. Manufacturing will remain a significant part of China’s economy for years. The infrastructure and government policies are far better for it than in most markets, making producing still worth it for multinationals. However, the kinds of manufacturing will necessarily change. Instead of turning out cheap products, less-polluting factories will increasingly be pushing out high-quality electronics and auto supply parts and the like.

Chinese companies need to focus on moving up the value chain – key to long term competitiveness

Wong ’12 [January 3, 2012. Edy Wong is from the Centre for International Business Studies School of Business, University of Alberta, Canada. “China’s Move up the Value Chain. A Framework for Analysis” Georgetown University Journal of Globalization, Competitiveness, and Governability <http://gcg.universia.net/pdfs_revistas/articulo_221_1335526869750.pdf>]

While some evidence of initial success is reported, there remains much concern with China’s capability to do become a producer and exporter of high technology products. Given China’s production capability and factor endowment, it is generally accepted that further development of suitable human resources, technological know-how, management expertise skills, and other innovative skills is required for China to move up the value chain. The current supplies of such ingredients in China are considered inadequate by many for a rapid transformation and upgrade of China’s value chain position. Indeed, these are the same essential determinants of an economy’s long-term competitiveness identified in the literature on ‘new economic geography’, business studies, regional science, and innovative studies (Humphrey and Schmitz, 2002). China must continue to develop these factors as it continues on its development path. Not surprisingly, government policies in China have actively focused on the cultivation of these factors both as a matter of developmental policy and as support for Chinese firms to augment their competitiveness and move up the value chain.

Increasing US-Mexico border efficiency reduces production costs and facilitates re-shoring

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Driven by a series of global developments and technological advances, a manufacturing renaissance is taking hold in the United States and Mexico that is increasing the competitiveness of regional industry and the volume of U.S.-Mexico trade. After many companies moved their factories to Asia in search of cheap wages over the past two decades, new trends are pulling production facilities back to North America. While manufacturing wages in China were four times less than Mexico in 2000, they are now nearly equal and are expected to be 25 percent higher than Mexican labor costs by 2015.1 The simple math of wage differentials drove the past decade’s movement of factories from the U.S. and Mexico to China, but companies are taking an increasingly holistic approach in deciding where to locate factories, considering transportation costs and shipping times; exchange rate and political risks; language, culture, and time zone differences; contract and intellectual property law enforcement; security; production flexibility; the supply and cost of materials and energy; and the availability of skilled and educated workers. In most of these categories, Mexico is gaining ground or maintains a distinct advantage over other regions of the world, particularly in terms of serving markets throughout the Americas. For example, between 2007 and December 2012, the value of the Mexican Peso fell by 17 percent compared to the U.S. Dollar and by a full 33 percent compared to the Chinese Yuan, improving the competitiveness of regional exports vis-à-vis Chinese goods.2 Crude oil prices rose 231 percent between 2002 and 2012, thus raising shipping costs and incentivizing the use of shorter, regional rather than longer, transcontinental supply chains.3 New drilling techniques, however, are changing the outlook for oil and especially natural gas, opening access to new reserves, increasing production, and therefore lowering some energy costs. While this may eventually lower long-range shipping costs, the more immediate effect is proving to be a major decline in natural gas prices, which has already lowered electricity costs in some parts of the United States and has the potential to do so throughout both the region. Such a decline in prices provides a major boost to energy intensive industries, such as steel, and petrochemical producers. The United States is on the forefront of the technological advances in the energy industry and stands to gain the most from them, but Mexico could reap the benefits as well should it either reform its energy industry to take advantage of its significant shale gas reserves or develop the pipeline infrastructure to support increased gas imports from the United States. Technological advances and improvements in the manufacturing process and logistics are revolutionizing industrial production in ways that significantly change cost structures, further incentivizing those that had offshored to China to consider near-shoring in Mexico or re-shoring their production back to the United States. Robots and the high-tech sensors that allow them to function with precision are allowing many of the simple, repetitive jobs that traditionally made up factory work obsolete. The need for large numbers of relatively unskilled laborers is on the decline, and the need for high skilled technicians who can program and maintain the complex machines and robots of today’s factories is on the rise. As a result, labor costs are a shrinking portion of total production costs, as evidenced by a recent study that found only 5.3% of the price of an iPhone goes to offshore manufacturing wages.4 This shift opens an opportunity for advanced economies like the U.S. to recoup some of their share of global manufacturing, especially if the complementary nature of high-tech design and production in the U.S. is complemented with lower cost manufacturing in Mexico for the portions of production that still require a higher degree of manual labor. The widespread implementation of lean manufacturing principles has improved the efficiency and agility of factories around the world. One important area in which fat has been cut from the manufacturing process is in warehousing. Just-in-time supply chain management has minimized the costly storage of parts and products, thus fueling the trend of regionalization in manufacturing by increasing the importance of a robust network of nearby suppliers. It is also greatly increasing the need for short and predictable wait times at the U.S. land borders since an unexpected delay has the potential to shut down production until the needed parts arrive at their destination.

Mexican manufacturing trades off with Chinese – Mexican imports are more long term and stable

Wilson ‘11 [November 2011. Christopher Wilson is Program Associate with the Woodrow Wilson Center’s Mexico Institute, where he focuses on U.S.-Mexico economic integration and border issues. “Working Together: Economic Ties Between The United States And Mexico” Mexico Institute, Woodrow Wilson International Center For Scholars. <http://www.wilsoncenter.org/sites/default/files/Working%20Together%20Full%20Document.pdf>]

When China joined the WTO in 2001, it consolidated its position as a popular location for offshore production due to extraordinarily low labor costs. Total compensation in the manufacturing industry, including wages and benefits paid both directly to employees and through taxes, totaled less than a dollar per hour. In 2003, average hourly compensation in China was just 62 cents, while in Mexico’s manufacturing sector it was $5.06.94 Many Mexican maquiladoras shut down and relocated to China. In fact, between October 2000 and March 2002, maquiladora production declined by 30%.95 Since the early 2000s, Mexican manufacturing has recovered. At the same time, economic growth in China has caused wages to rise. China’s hourly compensation costs in manufacturing more than doubled between 2003 and 2008, rising from 62 cents to $1.36 per hour. Over the same period, Mexico’s wages rose just 21%, from $5.06 to $6.12 per hour.96 While the dollar amount of the rise in labor costs was actually greater in Mexico during this period, the rate of growth suggests wages will occupy an ever-greater portion of production costs in China, a factor that, over time, could erode its competitive advantage. Still, if wages were the only factor, it would make more sense for U.S.-based companies to offshore their manufacturing to China. Several additional factors, however, have helped keep Mexico’s factories competitive. Because of geographic proximity, shipping goods between the U.S. and Mexico is cheaper (especially with the currently high fuel costs) and substantially faster than shipping to and from China. Transport usually takes a few days rather than several weeks. Similarly, executives of U.S.-based companies with production facilities abroad can communicate with plant managers and travel to Mexico to monitor and adjust production much more easily than is the case for Chinese production. Mexico’s comparative advantages, largely based on geography and NAFTA, are more long-term and stable than many of those associated with China.

Chinese economic decline causes miscalc and draws in the US

Auslin 09 (Michael, resident scholar at the American Enterprise Institute, 2009, “Averting Disaster Preventing the worst case scenario in Asia”, 2-5, <http://www.weeklystandard.com/Content/Public/Articles/000/000/016/115jtnqw.asp?page=2>)

AS THEY DEAL WITH a collapsing world economy, policymakers in Washington and around the globe must not forget that when a depression strikes, war can follow. Nowhere is this truer than in Asia, the most heavily armed region on earth and riven with ancient hatreds and territorial rivalries. Collapsing trade flows can lead to political tension, nationalist outbursts, growing distrust, and ultimately, military miscalculation. The result would be disaster on top of an already dire situation. No one should think that Asia is on the verge of conflict. But it is also important to remember what has helped keep the peace in this region for so long. Phenomenal growth rates in Japan, South Korea, Hong Kong, Singapore, China and elsewhere since the 1960s have naturally turned national attention inward, to development and stability. This has gradually led to increased political confidence, diplomatic initiatives, and in many nations the move toward more democratic systems. America has directly benefited as well, and not merely from years of lower consumer prices, but also from the general conditions of peace in Asia. Yet policymakers need to remember that even during these decades of growth, moments of economic shock, such as the 1973 Oil Crisis, led to instability and bursts of terrorist activity in Japan, while the uneven pace of growth in China has led to tens of thousands of armed clashes in the poor interior of the country. Now imagine such instability multiplied region-wide. The economic collapse Japan is facing, and China's potential slowdown, dwarfs any previous economic troubles, including the 1998 Asian Currency Crisis. Newly urbanized workers rioting for jobs or living wages, conflict over natural resources, further saber-rattling from North Korea, all can take on lives of their own. This is the nightmare of governments in the region, and particularly of democracies from newer ones like Thailand and Mongolia to established states like Japan and South Korea. How will overburdened political leaders react to internal unrest? What happens if Chinese shopkeepers in Indonesia are attacked, or a Japanese naval ship collides with a Korean fishing vessel? Quite simply, Asia's political infrastructure may not be strong enough to resist the slide towards confrontation and conflict. This would be a political and humanitarian disaster turning the clock back decades in Asia. It would almost certainly drag America in at some point, as well. First of all, we have alliance responsibilities to Japan, South Korea, Australia, and the Philippines should any of them come under armed attack. Failure on our part to live up to those responsibilities could mean the end of America's credibility in Asia. Secondly, peace in Asia has been kept in good measure by the continued U.S. military presence since World War II. There have been terrible localized conflicts, of course, but nothing approaching a systemic conflagration like the 1940s. Today, such a conflict would be far more bloody, and it is unclear if the American military, already stretched too thin by wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, could contain the crisis. Nor is it clear that the American people, worn out from war and economic distress, would be willing to shed even more blood and treasure for lands across the ocean. The result could be a historic changing of the geopolitical map in the world's most populous region. Perhaps China would emerge as the undisputed hegemon. Possibly democracies like Japan and South Korea would link up to oppose any aggressor. India might decide it could move into the vacuum. All of this is guess-work, of course, but it has happened repeatedly throughout history. There is no reason to believe we are immune from the same types of miscalculation and greed that have destroyed international systems in the past.

Scenario 2: Economy

Even minor inefficiencies at the border multiply to affect both countries.

Wilson ‘11 (Christopher E., “Working Together: Economic Ties Between The United States and Mexico,” Mexico Institute,¶ Woodrow Wilson International¶ Center for Scholars, November, http://www.wilsoncenter.org/sites/default/files/Working%20Together%20Full%20Document.pd

Pg. 1-2, KD)

More than a line dividing the two countries, the nearly 2,000 mile Southwest Border connects the United States and Mexico. More than half a million people and a little less than a billion dollars in goods cross the border each day.80 The border region is made up of four U.S. and six Mexican states with tightly integrated economies that, in total, have a GDP of greater than $3.5 trillion.81 But as important as the region’s local economy is the role it plays as the gateway for the vast majority of U.S.-Mexico economic transactions. Nearly 80% of the goods traded with Mexico by all fifty states cross the border by land, making the efficient operation of the border by officials in both countries key to keeping U.S. exports competitive and¶ imports cheap.82 Well-managed borders are vital to a healthy North American economy. The intensity of commerce, and especially the widespread nature of production sharing (with products crisscrossing the border several times as they are produced) mean that seemingly minor inefficiencies in border management can have profound effects on the national economies of the U.S. and Mexico. The complex set of security challenges faced by the United States complicates border management, but maintaining a safe border does not necessarily imply sacrifices in commercial and social cross-border links.

Manufacturing K2 the economy—6 warrants

Rynn ‘11

Jon Rynn is the author of the book Manufacturing Green Prosperity: The power to rebuild the American middle class, available from Praeger Press. He holds a Ph.D. in political science and is a Visiting Scholar at the CUNY Institute for Urban Systems. Rooseveltinstitute: Six Reasons Manufacturing is Central to the Economy.http://rooseveltinstitute.org/new-roosevelt/six-reasons-manufacturing-central-economy¶ Paul Krugman recently argued that “manufacturing is one of the bright spots of a generally disappointing recovery, and there are signs — preliminary, but hopeful, nonetheless — that a sustained comeback may be under way.” He points out that the gap between what we sell and what we buy has been improving. This must be set against a background of a manufacturing decline in the United States of historic dimensions; even without adjusting for inflation, the trade deficit in goods for the United States between 2000 and 2010 was 7 trillion dollars. A turnaround in the attention of more perceptive economists and a turnaround in manufacturing may be in the works. But before that, the crucial question is: **Why is manufacturing so important?**¶ **1. Manufacturing has been the path to development**¶ **It has been the strategic achievement of rich nations** over the last several hundred years to create **a high-quality manufacturing sector** in order to **develop national wealth and power**, as Erik Reinert shows in his book “How Rich Countries Got Rich…and Why Poor Countries Stay Poor.” From the rise of England in the 19th century, to the rise of the US, Germany, Japan and the USSR in the 20th, to the newly industrializing countries like Korea, Taiwan, and now China, **manufacturing has been the key to prosperity.**¶ **2. Manufacturing is the foundation of global “Great Power”**¶ The most powerful nations in the world — the “Great Powers” — are those that control the bulk of the global production of manufacturing technology. That is, it isn’t enough simply to have factories and produce more goods, you have to know how to make the machinery that makes the goods. The key to power, then, is to make the “means of production.”¶ **As the machinery industries go, so goes Great Power**. My own research shows that about 80% of the world’s production of factory machinery has been controlled by what we would consider the “Great Powers.” Until the 1950s, the US had produced about 50%; we now produce less than China’s 16%.¶ **3. Manufacturing is the most important cause of economic growth**¶ **The growth of manufacturing machinery output, and technological improvements in that machinery, are the main drivers of economic growth**. No machinery industries, no sustained, long-term economic growth. Just consider the explosion of the Internet, iPhones, and the like — all made possible by a small subset of production machinery called semiconductor-making equipment (SME), which itself is dependent on other forms of production machinery, such as the machine tools that grind the lenses they use or the alloys of metal the metal-making industries output. These technologies reproduce themselves, as when an SME makes the semiconductors that then go to make more SMEs, or when a machine tool makes the metal components that not only go into other pieces of machinery, such as cars, but are used to produce yet more machine tools. The technological and productive potential of machine tools and SMEs affect each other as well, leading to the explosive economic growth of the last two hundred years.¶ Sign up for weekly ND20 highlights, mind-blowing stats, and event alerts**.**¶ **4. Global trade is based on goods**, not services¶ A country can’t trade services for most of its goods. According to the WTO, 80% of world trade among regions is merchandise trade — that is, only 20% of world trade is in services. This closely matches the trade percentages that even the US, allegedly becoming “post-industrial,” achieves. If in the extreme case an economy was composed only of services, then it would be very poor, because it couldn’t trade for goods; its currency would be worth very little. The dollar is also vulnerable in the long-term. A “post-industrial” economy is really a pre-industrial economy — that is, poor.¶ **5. Services are dependent on manufactured goods**¶ **Services are mostly the act of using manufactured goods. You can’t export the experience of using something. Retail and wholesale, which make up about 11% of the economy, are the act of buying and selling manufactured goods.** The same goes for real estate, another 13%, which is the act of buying and selling a “real” or physical asset, a building. Even health, which makes up about 8% of the economy, is the act of using medical equipment and drugs (all figures from 2010, value-added).¶ Finance involves the redirection of surplus resources that the nonfinancial sector of the economy produces, which means that indirectly, even finance is dependent on manufacturing. The cycle of rise and decline usually runs like this: some clever society figures out how to take advantage of the current technologies of production, thus generating huge surpluses, which either the financial forces, the very wealthy, or the military then appropriate for their own wealth and power; they kill the goose that is laying the golden eggs. To sum up: the health of the economy is critically dependent on the health of the manufacturing sector.¶ 6. Manufacturing creates jobs¶ Most jobs, directly or indirectly, depend on manufacturing — and reviving the sector could provide tens of millions of new jobs, eradicating the Great Recession. In 2005, the Japanese manufacturing sector was 20.2% of its economy, in Germany it was 23.2%, and in the US manufacturing accounted for 13.4%, according to the the OECD. Using 2005 figures, if the US had the same percentage as Japan, we would have 7 million more high-quality, long-term, well paying jobs. If we were equal with Germany, we would have 10 million more. And according to the Economic Policy Institute, **each manufacturing job supports almost three other jobs in the economy. That** makes sense, considering the other five reasons that manufacturing is central to the economy.¶ Thus, there are six solid reasons that we need to rebuild the manufacturing sector of the United States. **It’s time for the United States to wake up before it’s too late** and rebuild the foundation of a strong, prosperous, middle class economy.

Scholarly consensus concludes economic crisis causes and intensifies war

Royal 10 – Director of Cooperative Threat Reduction at the U.S. Department of Defense (Jedediah, “Economics of War and Peace: Economic, Legal, and Political Perspectives,” pg 213-215.

Less intuitive is how periods of economic decline may increase the likelihood of external conflict. Political science literature has contributed a moderate degree of attention to the impact of economic decline and the security and defense behavior of interdependent states. Research in this vein has been considered at systemic, dyadic and national levels. Several notable contributions follow. First, on the systemic level, Pollins (2008) advances Modelski and Thompson’s (1996) work on leadership cycle theory, finding that rhythms in the global economy are associated with the rise and fall of a pre-eminent power and the often bloody transition from one pre-eminent leader to the next. As such, exogenous shocks such as economic crises could usher in a redistribution of relative power (see also Gilpin, 1981) that leads to uncertainty about power balances, increasing the risk of miscalculation (Fearon 1995). Alternatively, even a relatively certain redistribution of power could lead to a permissive environment for conflicts as a rising power may seek to challenge a declining power (Werner, 1999). Separately, Pollins (1996) also shows that global economic cycles combined with parallel leadership cycles impact the likelihood of conflict among major, medium and small powers, although he suggests that the causes and connections between global economic conditions and security conditions remains unknown. Second, on a dyadic level, Copeland’s (1996, 2000) theory of trade expectations suggest that “future expectation of trade” is a significant variable in understanding economic conditions and security behavior of states. He argues that interdependent states are likely to gain pacific benefits from trade so long as they have an optimistic view of future trade relations. However, if the expectations of future trade decline, particularly for difficult to replace item such as energy resources, the likelihood for conflict increases, as states will be inclined to use force to gain access to those resources. Crises could potentially be the trigger for decreased trade expectations either on its own or because it triggers protectionist moves by interdependent states. Third, others have considered the link between economic decline and external armed conflict at a national level. Blomberg and Hess (2002) find a strong correlation between internal conflict and external conflict, particularly during periods of economic downturn. They write, The linkages between internal and external conflict and prosperity are strong and mutually reinforcing. Economic conflict tends to spawn internal conflict, which in turn returns the favor. Moreover, the presence of a recession tends to amplify the extent to which international and external conflicts self-reinforce each other. (Blomberg and Hess, 2002, p. 89) Economic decline has also been linked with an increase in the likelihood of terrorism (Blomberg, Hess and Weerapana, 2004), which has the capacity to spill across borders and lead to external tensions. Furthermore, crises generally reduce the popularity of a sitting government. “Diversionary theory” suggests that, when facing unpopularity arising from economic decline, sitting governments have increased incentives to fabricate external military conflicts to create a “rally around the flag” effect. Wang (1996), DeRouen (1995) and Blomberg, Hess and Thacker (2006) find supporting evidence showing that economic decline and use of force are at least indirectly correlated. Gelpi (1997), Miller (1999), and Kisangani and Pickering (2009) suggest that the tendency towards diversionary tactics are greater for democratic states than autocratic states due to the

US-Mexico economic cooperation is the only hope for sustaining the global economic recovery – growth in Europe, China, and Japan are too soft to keep the world economy afloat

Schiffer ‘13 Michael Schiffer President of the Inter-American Dialogue “A More Ambitious Agenda: A Report of the Inter-American Dialogue’s commission on Mexico-US relations.” February http://www.thedialogue.org/PublicationFiles/IAD9042\_USMexicoReportEnglishFinal.pdf

The first is to reinforce and deepen economic cooperation. That includes increasing the productivity and international competitiveness of both nations, opening opportunities for longterm growth and job creation, and setting the stage for further economic integration. In a world of persistent, widespread economic insecurity, the more the United States and Mexico coordinate and integrate their economies, the more ably they can compete for global markets. Their economic cooperation is more vital than ever as drivers of the global economy falter—as the European financial crisis persists, as China enters a period of slower growth, as Japan remains stalled, and as many emerging markets appear increasingly vulnerable. Among the concrete objectives the two countries should consider are development of a framework to make their shared labor markets more efficient and equitable; formation of a coherent North American energy market (which could help meet the needs of energy-poor Central America); and coordination among the United States, Mexico, and Canada in negotiations toward the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP).

# 2AC

## Topicality

1. Counter- interpretation – Economic Engagement can be tactical or structural linkage of economic benefits

Mastanduno 8 Michael – Nelson Rockefeller Professor of Government and Associate Dean for the Social Sciences at Dartmouth. “Economic Statecraft” in Foreign Policy: Theories, Actors & Cases ed Smith, Hadfield, Dunne. p. 182-3

Positive economic statecraft may be defined as the provision or promise of economic benefits to induce changes in the behaviour of a target state. 1 It is important to distinguish between two types. The first involves the promise of a well-specified economic concession in an effort to alter specific foreign or domestic policies of the target government. I call this version tactical linkage; others refer to 'carrots', or 'specific positive linkage'. A second version, which I term structural linkage and which others refer to as 'general positive linkage' or 'long-term engagement', involves an effort to use a steady stream of economic benefits to reconfigure the balance of political interests within a target country. Structural linkage tends to be unconditional; the benefits are not turned on and off according to changes in target behaviour. The sanctioning state expects instead that sustained economic engagement will eventually produce a political transformation and desirable changes in target behaviour.

## Relations

## Trade

## Manufacturing

## Kritik

Epistemology isn’t first—Method focus causes scholarly stagnation – turns their framework—we do not endorse the language in this card

Patrick Thadeus Jackson, associate professor of IR – School of International Service @ American University, 11 [The Conduct of Inquiry in International Relations, p. 57-59]

Perhaps the greatest irony of this instrumental, decontextualized importation of “falsification” and its critics into IR is the way that an entire line of thought that privileged disconfirmation and refutation—no matter how complicated that disconfirmation and refutation was in practice—has been transformed into a license to worry endlessly about foundational assumptions. At the very beginning of the effort to bring terms such as “paradigm” to bear on the study of politics, Albert O. Hirschman (1970b, 338) noted this very danger, suggesting that without “a little more ‘reverence for life’ and a little less straightjacketing of the future,” the focus on producing internally consistent packages of assumptions instead of actually examining complex empirical situations would result in scholarly paralysis. Here as elsewhere, Hirschman appears to have been quite prescient, inasmuch as the major effect of paradigm and research programme language in IR seems to have been a series of debates and discussions about whether the fundamentals of a given school of thought were sufficiently “scientific” in their construction. Thus we have debates about how to evaluate scientific progress, and attempts to propose one or another set of research design principles as uniquely scientific, and inventive, “reconstructions” of IR schools, such as Patrick James’ “elaborated structural realism,” supposedly for the purpose of placing them on a firmer scientific footing by making sure that they have all of the required elements of a basically Lakatosian19 model of science (James 2002, 67, 98–103).¶ The bet with all of this scholarly activity seems to be that if we can just get the fundamentals right, then scientific progress will inevitably ensue . . . even though this is the precise opposite of what Popper and Kuhn and Lakatos argued! In fact, all of this obsessive interest in foundations and starting-points is, in form if not in content, a lot closer to logical positivism than it is to the concerns of the falsificationist philosophers, despite the prominence of language about “hypothesis testing” and the concern to formulate testable hypotheses among IR scholars engaged in these endeavors. That, above all, is why I have labeled this methodology of scholarship neopositivist. While it takes much of its self justification as a science from criticisms of logical positivism, in overall sensibility it still operates in a visibly positivist way, attempting to construct knowledge from the ground up by getting its foundations in logical order before concentrating on how claims encounter the world in terms of their theoretical implications. This is by no means to say that neopositivism is not interested in hypothesis testing; on the contrary, neopositivists are extremely concerned with testing hypotheses, but only after the fundamentals have been soundly established. Certainty, not conjectural provisionality, seems to be the goal—a goal that, ironically, Popper and Kuhn and Lakatos would all reject.

Borders are inevitable and necessary to solve violence

WILLIAMS, ’03 [john, dept of politics; territorial borders, international ethics, and geography: do good fences make good neighbors, Geopolitics, vol. 8 no. 2, summer, p.jstor, mtp]

A cosmopolitan international ethic thus needs to engage with the desirability of division as well as to promote inclusiveness.  There is a need for cosmopolitan ethics to go further than identifying the consequences of territorial borders that are the frequent target of normative critique.  Repression, religious intolerance, discrimination, ethnic cleansing, and so on have become inextricably associated with the territorial state.  The consequences of the existence of territorial borders can indeed be extreme and morally repugnant.  However, whether such efforts are an inevitable and essential result of the existence of territorial borders seems far less certain.  We may argue that the role of territorial borders to divide in international politics is potentially ethically justifiable.  Such justification needs to be rooted in elements of existing practice and values that are generally regarded as legitimate and serving important purposes in shaping the way the world ought to be.  If we accept the view of normative theory outlined earlier then we can see that the social creation and recreation of ethics includes, via mechanisms like territorial borders, a view of division and distinction that is ethically valued.  An appreciation of the constructed and dynamic nature of territorial borders holds out the prospect of being able to detach these aspects from the more violent practices that have also accumulated around territorial borders.  This, of course, is easier said than done

**The critique can’t solve – attempts to deconstruct borders will only create the conditions that foster reterritorialization**

Tuathail – 96 Assistant professor of Geography at Virginia Polytechnic Institute- 1996 (Gearoid, “Visions and Vertigo: Postmodernity and the Writing of Global Space” Critical Geopolitics p.230)

While it **is important not to exaggerate the degree of globalization and** deterritorialization, these and other material transformations have rendered the rigidities of the modern sociospatial triad of the interstate system(state sovereignty, territorial integrity, and community identity) increasingly problematic. This heavily mythologized triad of state-territory-community was never perfectly set and stable in any country, but its **instability and precariousness are becoming more and more pronounced as places are denationalized and globalized by transnational flows**. These tendencies were occurring well before the dramatic collapse of Communism and subsequent disintegration of the territorial organization of the Eastern bloc and Soviet empire after 1989. This implosion of the geopolitical order of the Cold War starkly foregrounded the degree to which the post—World War II world order had come apart and placed the meaning of the “West,”“Europe,” and the “United States” as sociospatial identities in crisis, thus provoking the experience of vertigo we have noted. But **every deterritorialization creates the conditions for a reterritorialization of order using fragments of the beliefs, customs, practices, and narratives of the old splintered world order**. Out of the experience of vertigo, **newly imagined visions of state**, territory, and community are projected in an effort **to restabilize and reterritorialize identity amid global flux.** As one order of space unravels, new orders are deployed to retriangulate local foregrounds against global backgrounds into new productions of global space.

Perm: do the plan and all parts of the alternative not mutually exclusive with the plan. The perm solves best – Agamben makes a politics based on contingency and demands for emancipation impossible – this form of politics is comparatively better than their alt.

Jean-Philippe Deranty, Professor of French and German Philosophy at Macquarie University, 2004, online:[http://www.borderlandsejournal.adelaide.edu.au/vol3no1\_2004/deranty\_agambnschall.htm](http://www.borderlandsejournal.adelaide.edu.au/vol3no1_2004/deranty_agambnschall.htm%22%20%5Ct%20%22_blank), accessed September 11, 2005

46. How can we heed Agamben’s warning about the necessity to continue to question the normativity of modernity after Auschwitz without dissolving politics into onto-theology? This seems to be one of the most pressing demands for political thought today. 47. If, with Rancière, we define politics not through the institution of sovereignty, but as a continual struggle for the recognition of basic equality, and thereby strongly distinguish politics from the police order viewed as the functional management of communities (Rancière 1999), then it is possible to acknowledge the normative break introduced by the democratic revolutions of the modern age without falling into a one-sided view of modernity as a neat process of rationalisation. What should be stressed about modernity is not primarily the list of substantive inalienable and imprescriptible human rights, but the equal entitlement of all to claim any rights at all. This definition of politics must be accompanied by the parallel acknowledgment that the times that saw the recognition of the fundamental equality of all also produced the total negation of this principle. But this parallel claim does not necessarily render the first invalid. Rather it points to a tension inherent in modern communities, between the political demands of equality and the systemic tendencies that structurally produce stigmatisation and exclusion.  48. One can acknowledge the descriptive appeal of thebiopower hypothesis without renouncing the antagonistic definition of politics. As Rancière remarks, Foucault’s late hypothesis is more about power than it is about politics (Rancière 2002). This is quite clear in the 1976 lectures (Society must be defended) where the term that is mostly used is that of "biopower". As Rancière suggests, when the "biopower" hypothesis is transformed into a "biopolitical" thesis, the very possibility of politics becomes problematic. There is a way of articulating modern disciplinary power and the imperative of politics that is not disjunctive. The power that subjects and excludes socially can also empower politicallysimply because the exclusion is already a form of address which unwittingly provides implicit recognition. Power includes by excluding, but in a way that might be different from a ban. This insight is precisely the one that Foucault was developing in his last writings, in his definition of freedom as "agonism" (Foucault 1983: 208-228): "Power is exercised only over free subjects, and only insofar as they are free" (221). The hierarchical, exclusionary essence of social structures demands as a condition of its possibility an equivalent implicit recognition of all, even in the mode of exclusion. It is on the basis of this recognition that politics can sometimesarise as the vindication of equality and the challenge to exclusion. 49. This proposal rests on a logic that challenges Agamben’s reduction of the overcoming of the classical conceptualisation of potentiality and actuality to the single Heideggerian alternative. Instead of collapsing or dualistically separating potentiality and actuality, one would find in Hegel’s modal logic a way to articulate their negative, or reflexive, unity, in the notion of contingency. Contingency is precisely the potential as existing, a potential that exists yet does not exclude the possibility of its opposite (Hegel 1969: 541-554). Hegel can lead the way towards an ontology of contingency that recognises the place of contingency at the core of necessity, instead of opposing them. The fact that the impossible became real vindicates Hegel’s claim that the impossible should not be opposed to the actual. Instead, the possible and the impossible are only reflected images of each other and, as actual, are both simply the contingent. Auschwitz should not be called absolute necessity (Agamben 1999a: 148), but absolute contingency. The absolute historical necessity of Auschwitz is not "the radical negation" of contingency, which, if true, would indeed necessitate a flight out of history to conjure up its threat. Its absolute necessity in fact harbours an indelible core of contingency, the locus where political intervention could have changed things, where politics can happen. Zygmunt Bauman’s theory of modernity and his theory about the place and relevance of the Holocaust in modernity have given sociological and contemporary relevance to this alternative historical-political logic of contingency (Bauman 1989). 50. In the social and historical fields, politics is only the name of the contingency that strikes at the heart of systemic necessity. An ontology of contingency provides the model with which to think together both the possibility, and the possibility of the repetition of, catastrophe, as the one heritage of modernity, and the contingency of catastrophe as logically entailing the possibility of its opposite. Modernity is ambiguous because it provides the normative resources to combat the apparent necessity of possible systemic catastrophes. Politics is the name of the struggle drawing on those resources. 51. This ontology enables us also to rethink the relationship of modern subjects to rights. Modern subjects are able to consider themselves autonomous subjects because legal recognition signals to them that they are recognised as full members of the community, endowed with the full capacity to judge. This account of rights in modernity is precious because it provides an adequate framework to understand real political struggles, as fights for rights. We can see now how this account needs to be complemented by the notion of contingency that undermines the apparent necessity of the progress of modernity. Modern subjects know that their rights are granted only contingently, that the possibility of the impossible is always actual. This is why rights should not be taken for granted. But this does not imply that they should be rejected as illusion, on the grounds that they were disclosed as contingent in the horrors of the 20th century. Instead, their contingency should be the reason for constant political vigilance. 52. By questioning the rejection of modern rights, one is undoubtedly unfaithful to the letter of Benjamin. Yet, if one accepts that one of the great weaknesses of the Marxist philosophy of revolution was its inability to constructively engage with the question of rights and the State, then it might be the case that the politics that define themselves as the articulation of demands born in the struggles against injustice are better able to bear witness to the "tradition of the oppressed" than their messianic counterparts.

## CP

#### Non-unique – Relations are low and collaboration is impossible

Hakim 12 President emeritus and senior fellow of the Inter-American Dialogue (Peter, Inter-American Dialogue,“Inter-American Discord: Brazil and the United States,”

<http://www.thedialogue.org/page.cfm?pageID=32&pubID=3115>

The US and Brazil have not had an easy time with each other in recent years. Although relations between the two countries are by no means adversarial or even unfriendly, they have featured more discord than cooperation—both regionally and globally. And there is little reason to expect dramatic change any time soon. At the 2005 summit meeting of hemispheric leaders, disagreements between the US and Brazil brought a halt to the faltering negotiations for the Free Trade Area of the Americas (FTAA). In 2009, it was largely US-Brazilian differences that delayed resolution of the Honduran political impasse for almost a year. Later in 2009, Brazil galvanized opposition across South America to block a US-Colombian military accord. Today, the two countries remain at loggerheads over Cuba’s participation in hemispheric affairs, disagree on how to manage relations with Paraguay in the aftermath of the impeachment and ouster of President Lugo, and continue to have sharply diverging views on the appropriate roles of the Organization of American States and its Inter-American Human Rights Commission. Even more unsettling for US-Brazilian relations have been the clashes over global issues. Washington has been especially troubled, and the bilateral relationship most bruised, by Brazil’s defense of Iran’s nuclear program and its opposition to UN sanctions on Iran. The two countries have also taken conflicting positions on nonproliferation questions, the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, and international responses to the uprisings in Syria and Libya. World trade negotiations have long been a matter of contention for both nations. Yet, despite their persistent disagreements, the US and Brazil are not antagonists or adversaries. The two countries have maintained friendly ties for years. US presidents and other senior officials are welcomed in Brazil, and Brazilian leaders are warmly received in Washington. The governments have consistently found ways to accommodate their differing views and defuse tensions and conflicts. For instance, only months after Brazil campaigned against a US-Colombia security pact, it signed its own, albeit modest, military accord with the US. Increasingly, Washington routinely defers to Brazil for leadership in South America—even on issues where the two countries differ. The US has supported and appreciated Brazil’s management of the UN peacekeeping mission in Haiti for the past seven years. President Obama even sought Brazilian help in dealing with the sensitive issue of Iran’s nuclear ambitions—although it later regretted doing so when Brazil joined Turkey in a far more ambitious and public negotiating role than had been anticipated. Brazilian and US leaders often publicly assert that their bilateral relationship is as good or better than it has ever been, and claim that it is continuing to improve. Although more commonly expressed by US officials, it is not unusual for each of the two governments to refer to the other as a global or regional partner—and to suggest that the two nations are working toward a more robust, even strategic relationship. Yet, despite the continuing rhetoric, neither country has done much in recent years to advance the development of deeper, more cooperative ties. Relations are not getting worse, but they are not getting better either. The two countries are not cooperating more today than they were a dozen years ago—and their differences have extended to a wider range of issues. They certainly have not found many areas for collaboration. The agreements they have reached seem mostly to be insubstantial or peripheral to the relationship, or they have not been effectively implemented. They have not led to any particularly productive collaboration. On most fronts, relations seem to be drifting, propelled largely by inertia, without much direction or decision. Even when the two nations have identified shared objectives that would advance the interests of both, they have rarely developed the cooperation needed to pursue them. The US and Brazil clearly have an array of common economic interests. Yet, they have not signed a single major economic pact in more than two decades—a period when Washington has reached free trade accords with some 20 countries worldwide, 11 in Latin America alone. In 2007, the two countries, which produce nearly 90 percent of the world’s ethanol, agreed to work together to establish world markets for the fuel and develop improved technologies for its production. But they have made little progress on either front.

#### Commitment to certainty is key to hegemony

APSA 09 – American Political Science Organization, September 2009, (“US Standing in the World: Causes, Consequences, and the Future”, http://www.apsanet.org/media/pdfs/apsa\_tf\_usstanding\_long\_report.pdf)

But two additional factors have come into play that reflect on America itself: first, a growing sense that Washington is no longer a dependable “team player,” and second, a fear that Americans may be less committed to providing international public goods today than they were during the Cold War. It is clear is that when the United States is seen as acting as a “team player,” it can have positive repercussions for U.S. standing, whereas perceptions of U.S. unilateralism can have the opposite effect. Whether these perceptions of U.S. behavior are accurate is open to debate, but when it comes to America’s standing in the world, perceptions define the reality. When the United States fails to sign and ratify high-profile, widely accepted international agreements, for example, its international standing falls, as has been the case with the Kyoto Protocol.27 The United States has ratified over one hundred other environmental agreements, which is over twice as many as Canada and France and five times as many as Japan.28 Yet the U.S. is known internationally largely for its unwillingness to ratify Kyoto. The United States has ratified over one hundred other environmental agreements . . . yet the U.S. is known internationally largely for its unwillingness to ratify Kyoto. US Standing in the World: Causes, Consequences, and the Future American standing also falls when Washington violates international laws and norms and fails to comply with U.S. treaty commitments and values. For example, violations of highprofile agreements, such as the Geneva Convention on torture, have clearly hurt U.S. standing as measured by opinion polls, statements by foreign governments, and NGOs.29 Evidence of prisoner abuse at Abu Ghraib and Guantanamo severely damaged the global esteem in which the U.S. was held, especially among its allies.30 U.S. reluctance to commit to new international legal obligations may in part be due to a generally strong compliance record with international law. Unlike some states, the U.S. is hesitant to sign agreements with which it knows it cannot comply. Nonetheless, a few highprofile cases wash out the effects of U.S. adherence to almost all of its other international treaty obligations. Perhaps perceived U.S. hypocrisy is more deleterious because we hold ourselves up—or others look to us—as a model. If the United States pursues controversial, high-profile policies through unilateral means when multilateral ones are expected, U.S. standing will likely suffer. This pattern seems apparent at the United Nations, where agreement with the United States increased significantly with the demise of the Cold War in the late 1980s. This was the time when the United States had newfound relative material power as the sole remaining superpower. The United States was also trumpeting a new form of international community. As President George H. W. Bush put it, the United States would “pursue our national interests, wherever possible, within a framework of concert with our friends and the international community.”31 It was a vision of a collaborative world in which the United States’ unchecked dominance would be used for jointly agreed ends.

## Politics

it’s dead

Burgess Everett, congressional reporter for Politico, 1/14 [“Harry Reid’s unemployment bet,” http://www.politico.com/story/2014/01/harry-reid-unemployment-bet-102181.html]

Faced with Democrats’ first big defeat of 2014, Senate Majority Leader Harry Reid is betting that his party’s message will trump growing Republican complaints about his leadership.¶ For more than a week, Reid kept the Senate focused on reviving expired emergency unemployment benefits, an effort that failed in two separate votes on Tuesday. During that time, Republicans transformed the debate into a referendum on Reid’s iron-fisted stewardship of the chamber, labeling the Nevada Democrat a “dictator” and “obstructionist.” They fumed that he was limiting consideration of amendments and pledged to install a more open process if the GOP wins control of the Senate in November.¶ But Reid dismisses the idea that Americans are interested in wonky procedural debates, believing instead they will remember this as the week that Republicans blocked the restoration of aid to more than a million long-term unemployed Americans.¶ “When people start talking endlessly about process, write op-eds about process and on the other side you have 1.4 million people who are desperate, desperate for some help, what argument wins?” Reid asked reporters Tuesday. “Of course, it’s the one trying to help 1.4 million people.”¶ Reid’s bet will need to pay off big to keep Democrats in the majority. Congressional Democrats and President Barack Obama are heading into the midterm elections focused on income inequality and the unemployment bill is a central pillar of that approach.¶ For now the bill isn’t going anywhere, failing to clear a pair of 60-vote thresholds on Tuesday.¶ The chamber voted 52-48 to reject a proposal to extend benefits through November and pay for it by extending the sequester’s mandatory spending cuts into 2024. A different measure to extend aid for three months — without a pay-for — was defeated 55-45.¶ “We made a step in the right direction, we didn’t get there unfortunately,” said Sen. Dan Coats (R-Ind.), who is a central player in the unemployment debate.¶ (Also on POLITICO: House easily approves 3-day CR)¶ Both measures needed 60 votes to advance and never were taken seriously by Republicans, all of whom with the exception of Sen. Dean Heller (R-Nev.) voted to sustain GOP filibusters. Heller is the lead GOP sponsor of the Senate’s effort to restore unemployment benefits, hailing from a state with one of the highest jobless rates in the nation.¶ The debate over extending benefits past 26 weeks, which expired on Dec. 28, has now consumed more than a week of floor time and gone nowhere, with each party charging the other is not serious about actually getting something done. Still needing to pass a spending bill to keep the government open before breaking for the Martin Luther King Jr. holiday next week, the future of the unemployment bill is now murky at best.¶ Democrats immediately blamed Republicans for blocking the legislation, dubbed a “cruel, shortsighted and immoral” move by House Minority Leader Nancy Pelosi.¶ Still, the debate hasn’t played out the way Democrats expected. They thought Republicans would block a three-month benefit extension last week and easily give the party a new talking point about GOP obstruction. To Democratic shock, six Republicans voted to open up debate on the bill, most under the condition that Reid open up the floor to amendments that would pay for the bill.¶ But once that initial hurdle was cleared, neither party ceded sufficient ground to hammer out a proposal that could actually pass the Senate. The latest Republican counteroffer to the Democratic proposals that failed Tuesday was a three-month benefit extension that also reversed downward cost-of-living adjustments for veterans, paid for by blunt spending cuts.

House GOP blocks everything – multiple pounders

Jonathan Weisman, NYT, 1/5/13, House G.O.P. Trims Agenda, Looking to Avert Election-Year Trouble, www.nytimes.com/2014/01/06/us/politics/house-gop-trims-agenda-looking-to-avert-election-year-trouble.html?ref=politics&\_r=0

The “do nothing” Congress is preparing to do even less.**¶** Representative Eric Cantor of Virginia, the House majority leader, is quietly playing down expectations for any major legislative achievements in the final year of the 113th Congress, which passed fewer laws in its first year — 65 — than any single session on record. The calendar, drawn up to maximize campaign time ahead of midterm elections in November, is bare bones, with the House in session just 97 days before Election Day, the last on Oct. 2, and 112 days in all.¶ In 2013, the House was in session 118 days before November and 135 in all.¶ House leaders are warning rank-and-file Republicans that the passage in December of the first comprehensive budget in years is unlikely to herald a return to even the once-routine task of passing all 12 of the spending bills that Congress is supposed to approve each year. And in a noted departure from previous end-of-session breaks, Republican leaders held no conference calls or large meetings in the long hiatus between adjourning on Dec. 13 and preparing to return on Tuesday.¶ “Things are slow for sure,” said one House Republican close to the party leadership.¶ Expectations for the session are so low that lawmakers say early action on White House priorities like raising the minimum wage, restoring unemployment benefits that expired and overhauling immigration laws are likely to go nowhere. Instead, Congress is likely to focus on more prosaic tasks: finishing negotiations on a farm bill that has languished for two years, agreeing on a law authorizing water projects, passing a spending bill for the current fiscal year and raising the debt ceiling by March. Only then might lawmakers move on to modest, piecemeal immigration measures.¶ The chances are “relatively low in terms of the probability that truly substantive legislation will be advanced through the House,” said Representative Scott Rigell, Republican of Virginia and a critic of Congress’s work pace.¶ That is a stark departure from the last three years, each of which dawned with high expectations from Republicans for balancing the federal budget, shrinking government sharply and repealing President Obama’s health care law.¶ In a memo to House Republicans on Friday that was decidedly modest on legislative intent, Mr. Cantor promised “to exercise our constitutional duty of oversight of Obamacare” and to schedule a vote on a bill requiring “prompt notification” in the event of a data breach on the federal HealthCare.gov website. Under the “appropriations” heading, he wrote, “This spring, we can expect a robust season of oversight and continued emphasis on spending reforms.”¶ The House’s slack pace and narrow agenda have angered a few members, cheered others who face tough re-election fights and yielded some support from lawmakers burned by the lofty conservative goals of recent years. Representative Tom Cole, Republican of Oklahoma, said the only real achievement of 2013 came when Representative Paul D. Ryan, Republican of Wisconsin, and Senator Patty Murray, Democrat of Washington, lowered their sights and struck a budget deal that reversed some across-the-board spending cuts and nudged down the deficit over 10 years.¶ “Big thinking has more often gotten us into trouble then led us to success,” Mr. Cole said.¶ Congress reopens on Monday with a set of issues it must address early in the session. On Jan. 15, much of the government will again run out of money unless lawmakers can pass a $1 trillion spending measure that fleshes out the instructions in the Ryan-Murray budget deal. Treasury Secretary Jacob J. Lew says that by March he will no longer be able to borrow money to finance the government unless the statutory borrowing limit is raised. And in the coming weeks, much of the nation’s farm program will expire without a breakthrough in talks.¶ Addressing those issues without a major breakdown could create enough good will for lawmakers to at least begin consideration of more ambitious endeavors.¶ “If these things don’t go well, other things don’t happen, simple as that,” Mr. Cole said.¶ By playing it safe, House leaders hope to keep their rank and file from leading Congress into a conflagration like the 16-day government shutdown in October. Republican political prospects have roared back since then on a wave of anger at the troubled rollout of the federal insurance exchange website under the Affordable Care Act, and Republican leaders are loath to jeopardize that momentum.¶ “It’s pretty clear to me in the House, we don’t want to make ourselves the issue,” said Representative Charlie Dent, Republican of Pennsylvania. “What happened in the fall with the shutdown, that was an act of political malpractice. We will be very careful not to make those kinds of unforced errors again.”¶ But Democrats insist they will not let doing nothing be an option. On Monday, the Senate Democratic leadership has scheduled the first legislative vote of the year, to cut off a threatened filibuster on restoring unemployment benefits that ended last month for 1.3 million Americans. On Tuesday, Mr. Obama will meet with some of the long-term unemployed now cut off from the federal lifeline.¶ A push to raise the minimum wage will follow the unemployment showdown. And Democrats are working aggressively to neutralize the political costs of the president’s health care law — or even to turn it into an asset by publicizing the millions of Americans now insured through it.¶ “We’re not going to let them get away with that,” Representative Steve Israel of New York, the chairman of the Democratic Congressional Campaign Committee, said of the “do-nothing” strategy. “One of the reasons the economy isn’t as strong as it should be is the Republicans’ avowed economic theory is to do nothing, and we intend to make that a central theme for 2014.”¶ The problem for Democrats is that Republicans simply do not fear their agenda. The nonpartisan Rothenberg Political Report rates only 28 Republican House seats in play; 207 Republican seats are considered safe. Even Republicans in nominally swing districts, such as Mr. Rigell and Mr. Dent, evince little concern for the Democratic push on the minimum wage and unemployment.¶ White House officials acknowledge the limitations of the president and expect Democrats to run on the themes and issues that best suit their state. But, the officials said, the Democratic base and independent voters will be attracted by the populist economic agenda, even if they live in heavily Republican states such as Kentucky or West Virginia.¶ A range of issues could distract from the party’s focus to stay united. The White House is pushing for a trade promotion bill, authored by Sen. Max Baucus (D-Mont.), but Senate Democratic leaders have privately scoffed at that measure. Plus there’s probably going to be another divisive fight on the Senate floor as soon as next month on the handling of military sexual assault cases. And there’s a growing push to bring an Iran sanctions bill to the floor, despite the White House’s staunch opposition.¶ Other Democrats aren’t waiting for the party’s agenda to come together.¶ Alaska Sen. Mark Begich, one of the most vulnerable Democrats, noted he would be focusing heavily on promoting the oil and gas industry in his red state, and he wants to make the case that he’s been at war with the White House and Senate Democrats in defending that industry.¶ “National Democrats often try to pay for something with oil and gas taxes,” Begich said. “And I have to explain that ain’t happening: That ain’t happening over my dead body.”¶ An all-Republican Congress would give Obama fits in his final two years and would attempt to damage Democrats’ chances at keeping the White House in 2016.¶ “It would mean he would have to deal with Congress,” Sen. John Cornyn (R-Texas) said of a Republican-controlled Senate. “Certainly we would have additional oversight and investigations, something we don’t have with Democratic chairmen in the Senate now.”¶ Asked whether the president would be an asset or liability in her election campaign this year, Sen. Mary Landrieu (D-La.) launched into a list of areas where she disagrees with Obama.¶ “I’m for the Keystone pipeline, he’s not. I’m for more domestic energy production. He’s been slow to the starting gate on that. Those are some things, those are some differences,” she said. “The president has already been elected. This year is about those of us running continuing to talk about the positive records we’ve had representing our state. The president is not on the ballot.”

1. No link—Plan is popular—growing bipartisan support for improving LPOES

Ramos 13 Kristian, Arizona Daily Star, June 7, New Democracy Network’s Policy Director of the 21st Century Border Initiative, “Updating Ports of Entry Will Help Preserve Our Vital Trade with Mexico” <http://kuldrahaks.net/NewMexicoTourism/jobs-in-mexico-tourism>

The immigration legislation making its way through Congress addresses legalization, border security, a transition to a more skills-based legal-immigration system and the national adoption of E-Verify. There is a growing bipartisan and bicameral consensus, however, about another key aspect of the emerging legislation as it relates to the border region, which deserves equal attention, if not more – the need to invest in, and modernize, our ports of entry with Mexico.” Modernizing our ports of entry is now an urgent national economic priority, and one of particular importance to Southern Arizona. Despite a recession and slow growth on the U.S. side of the border and security challenges on the Mexican side, the trade relationship between our two countries has exploded in recent years. According to a recently released study (co-authored by Arizonan Erik Lee), trade between the U.S. and Mexico has increased from $300 billion in 2009 to a staggering $536 billion last year. Mexico is now the U.S.’ third-largest trading partner and second-largest export market. Six million jobs in the U.S. are now dependent on U.S.-Mexico trade. All of these numbers, of course, will increase as trade flows continue to grow in the years ahead.

1. PC isn’t real

Edwards 9 – Distinguished Professor of Political Science at Texas A&M University, holds the George and Julia Blucher Jordan Chair in Presidential Studies and has served as the Olin Professor of American Government at Oxford [George, “The Strategic President”, Printed by the Princeton University Press, pg. 149-150]

Even presidents who appeared to dominate Congress were actually facilitators rather than directors of change. They understood their own limitations and explicitly took advantage of opportunities in their environments. Working at the margins, they successfully guided legislation through Congress. When their resources diminished, they reverted to the stalemate that usually characterizes presidential-congressional relations. As legendary management expert Peter Drucker put it about Ronald Reagan, "His great strength was not charisma, as is commonly thought, but his awareness and acceptance of exactly what he could and what he could not do."134 These conclusions are consistent with systematic research by Jon Bond, Richard Fleisher, and B. Dan Wood. They have focused on determining whether the presidents to whom we attribute the greatest skills in dealing with Congress were more successful in obtaining legislative support for their policies than were other presidents. After carefully controlling for other influences on congressional voting, they found no evidence that those presidents who supposedly were the most proficient in persuading Congress were more successful than chief executives with less aptitude at influencing legislators.135 Scholars studying leadership within Congress have reached similar conclusions about the limits on personal leadership. Cooper and Brady found that institutional context is more important than personal leadership skills or traits in determining the influence of leaders and that there is no relationship between leadership style and effectiveness.136 Presidential legislative leadership operates in an environment largely beyond the president's control and must compete with other, more stable factors that affect voting in Congress in addition to party. These include ideology, personal views and commitments on specific policies, and the interests of constituencies. By the time a president tries to exercise influence on a vote, most members of Congress have made up their minds on the basis of these other factors. Thus, a president's legislative leadership is likely to be critical only for those members of Congress who remain open to conversion after other influences have had their impact. Although the size and composition of this group varies from issue to issue, it will almost always be a minority in each chamber.

1. Winners win

Halloran 10 (Liz, Reporter – NPR, “For Obama, What A Difference A Week Made”, National Public Radio, 4-6, http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=125594396)

Amazing what a win in a major legislative battle will do for a president's spirit. (Turmoil over spending and leadership at the Republican National Committee over the past week, and the release Tuesday of a major new and largely sympathetic book about the president by New Yorker editor David Remnick, also haven't hurt White House efforts to drive its own, new narrative.) Obama's Story Though the president's national job approval ratings failed to get a boost by the passage of the health care overhaul — his numbers have remained steady this year at just under 50 percent — he has earned grudging respect even from those who don't agree with his policies. "He's achieved something that virtually everyone in Washington thought he couldn't," says Henry Olsen, vice president and director of the business-oriented American Enterprise Institute's National Research Initiative. "And that's given him confidence." The protracted health care battle looks to have taught the White House something about power, says presidential historian Gil Troy — a lesson that will inform Obama's pursuit of his initiatives going forward. "I think that Obama realizes that presidential power is a muscle, and the more you exercise it, the stronger it gets," Troy says. "He exercised that power and had a success with health care passage, and now he wants to make sure people realize it's not just a blip on the map." The White House now has an opportunity, he says, to change the narrative that had been looming — that the Democrats would lose big in the fall midterm elections, and that Obama was looking more like one-term President Jimmy Carter than two-termer Ronald Reagan, who also managed a difficult first-term legislative win and survived his party's bad showing in the midterms. Approval Ratings Obama is exuding confidence since the health care bill passed, but his approval ratings as of April 1 remain unchanged from the beginning of the year, according to [Pollster.com](http://www.pollster.com/polls/us/jobapproval-obama.php). What's more, just as many people disapprove of Obama's health care policy now as did so at the beginning of the year. According to the most recent numbers: Forty-eight percent of all Americans approve of Obama, and 47 disapprove. Fifty-two percent disapprove of Obama's health care policy, compared with 43 percent who approve. Stepping Back From A Precipice Those watching the re-emergent president in recent days say it's difficult to imagine that it was only weeks ago that Obama's domestic agenda had been given last rites, and pundits were preparing their pieces on a failed presidency. Obama himself had framed the health care debate as a referendum on his presidency. A loss would have "ruined the rest of his presidential term," says Darrell West, director of governance studies at the liberal-leaning Brookings Institution. "It would have made it difficult to address other issues and emboldened his critics to claim he was a failed president." The conventional wisdom in Washington after the Democrats lost their supermajority in the U.S. Senate when Republican Scott Brown won the Massachusetts seat long held by the late Sen. Edward Kennedy was that Obama would scale back his health care ambitions to get something passed. "I thought he was going to do what most presidents would have done — take two-thirds of a loaf and declare victory," says the AEI's Olsen. "But he doubled down and made it a vote of confidence on his presidency, parliamentary-style." "You've got to be impressed with an achievement like that," Olsen says. But Olsen is among those who argue that, long-term, Obama and his party would have been better served politically by an incremental approach to reworking the nation's health care system, something that may have been more palatable to independent voters Democrats will need in the fall. "He would have been able to show he was listening more, that he heard their concerns about the size and scope of this," Olsen says. Muscling out a win on a sweeping health care package may have invigorated the president and provided evidence of leadership, but, his critics say, it remains to be seen whether Obama and his party can reverse what the polls now suggest is a losing issue for them.

# 1AR

### Kritik

Don’t focus on representations

Tuathail 96 (Gearoid, Department of Georgraphy at Virginia Polytechnic Institute, Political Geography, 15(6-7), p. 664, science direct)

While theoretical debates at academic conferences are important to academics, the discourse and concerns of foreign-policy decision- makers are quite different, so different that they constitute a distinctive problem- solving, theory-averse, policy-making subculture. There is a danger that academics assume that the discourses they engage are more significant in the practice of foreign policy and the exercise of power than they really are. This is not, however, to minimize the obvious importance of academia as a general institutional structure among many that sustain certain epistemic communities in particular states. In general, I do not disagree with Dalby’s fourth point about politics and discourse except to note that his statement-‘Precisely because reality could be represented in particular ways political decisions could be taken, troops and material moved and war fought’-evades the important question of agency that I noted in my review essay. The assumption that it is representations that make action possible is inadequate by itself. Political, military and economic structures, institutions, discursive networks and leadership are all crucial in explaining social action and should be theorized together with representational practices. Both here and earlier, Dalby’s reasoning inclines towards a form of idealism. In response to Dalby’s fifth point (with its three subpoints), it is worth noting, first, that his book is about the CPD, not the Reagan administration. He analyzes certain CPD discourses, root the geographical reasoning practices of the Reagan administration nor its public-policy reasoning on national security. Dalby’s book is narrowly textual; the general contextuality of the Reagan administration is not dealt with. Second, let me simply note that I find that the distinction between critical theorists and post- structuralists is a little too rigidly and heroically drawn by Dalby and others. Third, Dalby’s interpretation of the reconceptualization of national security in Moscow as heavily influenced by dissident peace researchers in Europe is highly idealist, an interpretation that ignores the structural and ideological crises facing the Soviet elite at that time. Gorbachev’s reforms and his new security discourse were also strongly self- interested, an ultimately futile attempt to save the Communist Party and a discredited regime of power from disintegration. The issues raised by Simon Dalby in his comment are important ones for all those interested in the practice of critical geopolitics. While I agree with Dalby that questions of discourse are extremely important ones for political geographers to engage, there is a danger of fetishizing this concern with discourse so that we neglect the institutional and the sociological, the materialist and the cultural, the political and the geographical contexts within which particular discursive strategies become significant. Critical geopolitics, in other words, should not be a prisoner of the sweeping ahistorical cant that sometimes accompanies ‘poststructuralism nor convenient reading strategies like the identity politics narrative; it needs to always be open to the patterned mess that is human history.

#### Trying to rid them is comparatively worst option

Downes, 2k6 (Alexander Downes, Assistant Professor of Political Science at Duke, More Borders, Less Conflict?: Partition as a Solution to Ethnic Civil Wars, [http://muse.jhu.edu/journals/sais\_review/v026/26.1downes.html](http://muse.jhu.edu/journals/sais_review/v026/26.1downes.html%22%20%5Ct%20%22_blank))

<The conventional wisdom among scholars and policymakers opposes solving ethnic conflicts by drawing new borders and creating new states. This view, however, is flawed because the process of fighting civil wars imbues the belligerents with a deep sense of mistrust that makes sharing power after the conflict difficult. This is especially true in ethnic civil wars, in which negotiated power-sharing agreements run a high risk of failing and leading to renewed warfare. In light of these problems, this article argues that partition should be considered as an option for ending severe ethnic conflicts. The article shows how **failure to adopt partition in Kosovo has left that province in a semi-permanent state of limbo that only increases the majority Albanian population's desire for independence. The only route to long-term stability in the region—**and an exit for international forces—is **through partition**. Moreover, the article suggests that the United States should recognize and prepare for the coming partition of Iraq rather than pursuing the futile endeavor of implementing power-sharing among Iraq's Shi'ites, Kurds, and Sunnis.>